

**Ideologies through History
Papers of the seventeenth ISHA Conference
Utrecht, the Netherlands
April 17-22, 2006**

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EDITORIAL

And finally, Here is the final version of the Journal of the annual ISHA- Conference in Utrecht 2006. The Journal contains papers written and presented at the conference that took place from the 17th until the 22th of April 2006. Every workgroup had a theme, for example 'the end of history'. The workshop leaders wrote an introduction to the theme. We choose the most representative papers from every workgroup. We would like to thank all the people that had sent us their papers. We tried to interpret these texts as good as possible. We offer our sincere excuses if you are feeling misunderstood.

What remains for us is to thank the following people, who spent a lot of time working on this conference- book: first and foremost our professor Frans Willem Lantink for his encouragements and advice. Moreover he wrote the introduction paper of this journal. The pictures are made by Diewke van de Heuvel. For funding and all other kinds of help, our sincere thanks to the KF Hein Fonds, U-fonds, the University of Utrecht and the VIGU (Vrienden van het Instituut Geschiedenis Utrecht). Without their support, it would not have been possible to make this book.

Last but not least, thanks to all those who participated in the conference, who helped and organized the conference. For the writers of this book, is our editorial advice: 'Read this book!'

The editors:

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Utrecht, February 2008

CONTENT

EDITORIAL	5
PREFACE	
<i>Alan Potz, president ISHA-international 2005-2006</i>	9
IDEOLOGY THROUGH HISTORY	
<i>Mr. Dr. F.W. Lantink</i>	11
THE END OF HISTORY	
A CRITICAL COMMENTATORY TO FUKUYAMA	
<i>Jonas Ahlskog</i>	22
IDEOLOGIES IN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY	
ADOLF HITLER AND IDEOLOGY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM	
<i>Srdjan Micic</i>	33
IDEOLOGIES IN EASTERN EUROPE	
IDEOLOGICAL HERITAGE: EASTERN EUROPE AND COMMUNISM IMPACT OF COMMUNISTIC HERITAGE ON JOURNALISM AND THE MASS MEDIA IN SERBIA	
<i>Leonida Matajic</i>	46
TERRORISM AS AN IDEOLOGY?	
ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY AND TERRORISM AS STRATEGY	
<i>Kyösti Knuuttila</i>	52
EUROPE: NATIONALISM OR INTERNALISM?	
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LAPUA MOVEMENT	
<i>Harri Mäkelä</i>	58

SWITZERLAND BETWEEN INTERNALISATION AND NATIONAL ISOLATION <i>Ursula Kleinöder</i>	63
IDEOLOGIES IN ANCIENT TIMES, MIDDLE AGES AND EARLY MODERN TIMES GREAT EXPECTATIONS. THE IDEOLOGY OF SPARTAN MOTHERHOOD <i>Henrieke Korten</i>	69
NOBLE AND URBAN FAMILY-STRUCTURES IN THE HUNGARIAN KINGDOM IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES <i>Robert Balogh</i>	75
IMPORTANT FIGURES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEOLOGY FRIEDRICH ENGELS <i>Petri Toiviainen</i>	80
THE INVENTION OF TRADITION IN RELATION TO IDEOLOGY FROM RESCUER TO TRAITOR AND VICE VERSA. THE IMAGE OF THE CHETNIK AND PARTISAN IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS FOR PRIMARY SCHOOLS (in the period 1993–2005) <i>Jelena Petakovic</i>	86
FOLKLORE RELIGION IN TRANSYLVANIA <i>Marieta and Mihaela Rosu</i>	93
ABOUT THE CONFERENCE	98

PREFACE

At the beginning of a new conference, the function of the ISHA president is mostly a representative one and could be described as, on the one hand, welcoming the participants on behalf of the organisation providing the setting for the conference and, on the other hand, thanking the conference organisers on behalf of the participants. After a conference it is a delight to see that there has been done something with the results.

I am glad to be able to contribute to the journal of this XVIIth Annual Conference of the International Students of History Association (ISHA); twelve years, incidentally, after one of the first conferences in the history of our association was held in this exact same city. As it says in our promotional leaflet, ISHA basically is about meeting history students from other places, discussing history, learning about each other's countries, generally broadening one's horizon in the process, and of course sharing a generally good time together.

The fact that the conference was held in Utrecht, twelve years after the other conference I mentioned earlier, is something I would have had no reason to anticipate when I first started attending ISHA events myself. Why? Because there simply was no ISHA section in Utrecht in 2002, nor was there the following year. In 2004, however, Maartje Vermeulen and Ilse Raaijmakers from the local history students association. I think that shows some marvellous commitment on their side and makes them precisely the best new section ISHA could have hoped for. That basically wraps it about up for me. Except for this, of course: A big thanks for going through the trouble of organising this conference en making the journal, Utrecht. *Bedankt!*

Alan Götz
ISHA Heidelberg
President of ISHA 2006

IDEOLOGIES THROUGH HISTORY

Introduction by Dr. Frans Willem Lantink (University of Utrecht, Netherlands)

The topic of the history of ideologies is not only of historical interest after the proclaimed *end of ideology*. Are we not confronted today with actual problems, which all seem to have some sort of ideological connotation? What do we see when we are confronted with phenomena such as terrorism, new nationalistic conflicts and Muslim-fundamentalism? Has the history of the great ideologies come to an end, or do we witness today the emergence of completely new ideologies that are characteristic for the 21st century?

The history of ideologies

What constitutes an ideology? What defines ideologies? The first problem is the fact that there is no well-defined definition of the term. Difficulties in defining the term are part of its history. Many severe theoretical battles were fought on the concept of ideology, which makes the history of ideology in itself an ideological minefield. For much of its history the term 'ideology' has been used as a political weapon. The master in this battlefield was of course Karl Marx. Together with Friedrich Engels, first in the *German Ideology* and subsequently in concurrence with the leftwing pupils of Hegel and the French socialists, they condemned 'ideology' as a heresy in comparison to Marx' so called 'scientific approach', his scientific socialism. Ideology, in his theory, means false consciousness. A neutral term for ideology, linked to the prevailing ideas on society and the social stratification of society was developed later on.

'Ideology' and 'ideologies' are quite dissimilar things to study.¹ To examine ideology is, according to Heywood, to consider a particular type of political thought which is mainly concentrated on doctrines and theoretical political and sociological thought. On the

¹ Heywood, *Political Ideologies. An Introduction* (New York 2003), p.5. Cf. Terry Eagleton, *Ideology. An Introduction* (London 1991).

other hand, to study 'ideologies' is to be concerned with analysing not only the different and contradictory contents of political thought, but also with tracing the various ideological traditions and their interaction in the history of the modern age. In the end, the perception of the existence of extremely different ideologies in the 19th and 20th century leads to various historical questions, as the development of ideologies coincides with major changes in and transformations of the Western societies since the Age of the Enlightenment.

The theory of ideology takes off with the emergence of ideologies at the end of the 18th century and further develops, most notably, in the first decades of the 19th century. The history of ideology and ideologies as historical phenomena are a relatively new branches in science. Is it possible to write a history of ideologies from extra-ideological point of view? Is a purely historical view possible?

The genesis of ideologies is usually situated in the '*Sattelzeit*' (1750-1850), an Era which saw the rise of tensions as a result of modernisation from the late 18th century. The great economical, social and political changes caused by the forces of Industrialisation and the French Revolution created a great fault plane in European history. Giving meaning to and finding a position in this fault plane between old and modern times, according to some, has led to new notions and definitions of social change and mobility. In this crisis of meaning, which is in itself a reaction to and consequence of the Enlightenment, ideology has been regarded as a 'secular' religion. Ideology expressed the search for a new spiritual community and social cohesion in a time of transition and existential insecurity.

Every single one of the most significant modern political ideologies, notably liberalism, nationalism, socialism and conservatism, are into existence.

In all the modern ideologies of the West we can observe a reflection of the great social, political and economic transformations since the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolutions. However, not only do these ideologies offer a mental concept of the existing order and society, usually in the shape of a worldview. They also offer an utopian model of a desired future, and directions to how social and political change could and should be brought about. The modern ideologies are no mere reflections and products of historical change: they have shaped the modern age too. Our world today is, in many aspects, an inheritance of the great 19th century ideologies.

The French Revolution and the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars gave birth to four ideological main currents: Nationalism, Liberalism, Socialism and Conservatism. Liberalism and Socialism are rooted in the philosophy and political thought of the late Enlightenment. They share modern concepts, such as an anthropocentric world view, a new concept of humanity and human rights like equality, and the idea of progress of mankind. Especially after the 1840's, the two ideologies developed into completely antagonistic directions. The political history of the 19th and 20th centuries was dominated by the tensions between these ideologies. But not only were there long before the so called Third Way, the hybrid marriage between social democracy and neo liberalism, many examples of social liberal thought. In a higher level one could describe the modern nation state and the welfare state of the 20th century as a co-production of the liberal and socialist ideologies.

Conservatism can be regarded as a manifestation of anti-ideology and anti-revolutionary thought, a resistance to the ideas of the Enlightenment, the defence of the power of tradition and a celebration of the importance of tradition for society. The latter refers especially to the concern of religion for social cohesion and spirituality, in the rejection of all manifestations of the so-called progress. On the other hand, conservatism of the 19th and 20th centuries was more than just an anti-movement. Though many phenomena in the modern world are actually created or reshaped by conservative thought, I mention only the coming into existence of very successful confessional parties, completely new Christian democratic parties, the reinvention of religion as a form of social bounding and organisation in the 19th and 20th centuries. I will also concentrate on topics such as family policy, corporatism and new Christian social thought. Nowadays, nationalism is occasionally regarded as a politically incorrect and rightwing movement. Also, it is commonly associated with the many disasters of the 20th century including both World Wars and ethnic cleansing. We should not forget, however, that nationalism and the concept of the nation-state moulded modernity and our world today in a fundamental way. Moreover, nationalism is a chameleon-like ideology; it intertwines all different currents.

Fascism is a difficult ideology to analyse, for at least two reasons. Firstly, it is sometimes doubted if fascism can be regarded, in any meaningful sense, as an ideology comparable to earlier great ideologies. The emphasis on action instead of ideas and the lack of a consistent framework are more characteristic of a worldview than of a philosophical, coherent framework. Secondly, fascism has been a complex historical phenomenon. Therefore, it has been difficult to identify its core principles - it is difficult to fully understand where fascism begins and ends. The ideological reservoir and the roots of the fascist movements are extremely diverse. There are movements of nationalism, socialism and conservatism, but also modernistic, avantgardistic impulses. Racism is not characteristic for every fascist movement in the interbellum. Many deep contradictions can be found between Italian Fascism and National Socialism, for example the futurism and modernism of many manifestations of Italian Fascism on the one hand, and the ultra regressive peasant ideology, the German Ideology of National socialism on the other. Contradictions also occur within a fascist movement itself. The best example is the above mentioned Italian Fascism, which is rooted in Italian anarcho-socialism. Traces of futurism, however, never disappeared. Nevertheless, with the reconciliation with the Vatican after 1929, this fascist regime is regarded as a successful conservative regime.

What makes fascism a new ideology? All its manifestations have in common that they are the product of the post-First World War 'new age' of mass politics, and that they employ new communication media. There is an important shift from content to form, which is revealed by new ways of expression, exaltation, Ideology as a 'secular' religion and salvation. Fascism expressed the search for a new spiritual community and social cohesion. This great irrational appeal on emotions became an awful force. Fascism can be understood as a reaction against modernism but, unmistakably, as a clear product of modernity too.

After the defeat of Fascism in the Second World War, and the complete humanitarian failure of communism under Stalin, the two ideologies of fascism and communism were combined in the theory of totalitarianism. Typical for the so-called Cold War Liberalism was the image of a free Western society that was liberated from all forms of 'ideology'. Ideology was the enemy. Karl Poppers *The Open Society and its Enemies*, was the most profound expression of this philosophy.

Modern liberal society could do without these dangerous blueprints. Daniel Bell published his famous *The End of Ideology* in 1960. *On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. His analysis of American Society in the fifties, the so-called “fat fifties”, points out the interesting feature of the modern middle class society as an actual classless society. The proletariat has become a ‘salarial’. Class is not the main perspective any more, politics and political struggle have been transformed into a bureaucratic management. In the modern welfare state, there only rest managerial problems. The new elite is not an elite of owners anymore, which is elucidated by the shift from family enterprise to corporate enterprise. Bell analyses the failure of communism in the Soviet Union and clarifies why socialism is impossible in the United States. Bell’s *End of Ideology* must be understood in the context of the 1950’s and the Cold War. Nevertheless, what we can see here is a social liberal mixture that was typical for the American intellectual society of that time. This vision was in some ways reiterated Tony Blair’s ‘Third Way’ and the social liberal cabinets in the Netherlands of the 1920’s. In the later sixties and seventies, Bells book became somewhat old fashioned in the new emphasis on political struggle, polarisation and the views of neo-Marxists like Marcuse. The idea of the “end of ideology” made a comeback after 1989.

Ideology after 1989

The Fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989 was a shocking event. The post-war generations in the West did not expect to see this monolithic ideological power block come to an end in their lifetime. With the end of the Cold War a new ideological perspective was needed. Francis Fukuyama published a prophetic article in the summer of 1989, that would become a bestseller with the famous title: *The End of History and the Last Man* two years later. In this poorly written, superficial Hegel-imitation, Fukuyama claims that with the victory of liberal democracy over communism there will be no further evolution of ideologies. Liberal democracy is the ‘final form of human government’, and thus ‘the end of history’ was achieved. Fukuyama’s celebration of liberalism was more outspoken than Bell’s. Not surprisingly, the whole concept of *The End of Ideology* is criticised by the statement that these attacks on ideology are in itself profoundly ideological. It is an attempt, according to Heywood, to portray one

particular set of political ideas and values as superior to its rivals by predicting its own ultimate triumph. The mandate of history is called upon to claim the victory of a single ideology. The end of ideology is, in his view, an ideological construction. Karl Marx did the same thing with his prophecy of the classless society in the 19th century. Authors like Heywood conclude that ideology is a continuing and unending process. Will ideologies never die, then? It seems to be a question of definition. Certainly, there have been profound changes in the dominance of the old ideologies. In the post-modern world, a one dimensional worldview is no longer viable. Modern politicians, for example, make an eclectic use of the ideological heritage, and interchange easily between left or rightwing, modern or conservative points of view. The shift from old party politics into the image of the singular politician as celebrated in the media are possibly other signs of the end of ideology.

The slow transformation of Eastern European societies shows that development after communism has not been an easy task. Neo-liberalism prevailed after 1989, but the transition from a guided economy to a free market economy has been more difficult than expected. A painful post-totalitarian melancholy can be found everywhere. The unification of Germany did not bring about the splendid results that were predicted. On the contrary, more or less neo-communist parties are still an important, sometimes dominant political factor in East-Germany. There is still a certain nostalgia for the communist period. The humanitarian crises in the Balkan in the nineties, show that ethnic tensions and new inventions of nationalism can surface again. Is this merely a rear-guard action, a temporary regression to an earlier phase after 40 years of communism, or is this aggressive regionalism a new expression of ideology?

European culture and the rich variety of nations and nation-states are almost synonymous. All the achievements and all the negative effects of nationalism are connected to the history of the old continent. After the Second World War, the effort was made to put two centuries of national wars to an end, especially between the former archenemies France and Germany. European unity is one of the greatest success stories in the history of international relations. In recent years the European Union has not only expanded her powers, but has also been able to increase the number of states participating in the union to 25. The European Union (EU) still exerts a strong

attraction to neighbouring countries and candidate member states. Does this project entail the end of nationalism in Europe? The complete failure of the referenda in France and The Netherlands show us that the European integration has probably reached its limits. Many restrictions still exist for the new members like Poland, whereas the fear for cheap labour force from the east was absent during the thirty years of integration of Spain, Portugal and Greece. In those times, the spirit of European solidarity was still breathing. Conversely, the developing process of European integration is a sheer necessity on a larger world scale. Separate nation-states have no future in Europe.

Ideology in the 21st century?

The world has significantly changed as a result of the end of the Cold War, brought about by the collapse of communism, European revolutions in Eastern Europe, the recent emergence of Muslim-fundamentalism, and, after the attack on the World Trade Centre, the menace of terrorism. The optimistic perception of a new world order guided by a triumphant liberalism was severely questioned. As early as 1993, Samuel Huntington' criticized the concept of a unwavering world order in his '*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*'. For Huntington, the world order is characterised by instability and conflict. These are the consequences of the differences that exist between civilizations, cultures, religions and ethnic identities. For Huntington, it is a shift from ideology to culture. Many aspects of his thesis are a secret reception of Oswald Spenglers philosophy.²

Globalisation, however, points to a different direction. A thick web of economic and cultural dominance is growing together more and more. In complete opposition to Huntington, the West is not in defence. On the other hand, in this new chaotic yet interconnected world, the old one-dimensional ideologies seem not capable to survive. New forms of ideologies in the 21st century will perhaps no longer be connected to the social dimensions of one society, but will be transported by the new media; international, elusive, and nowhere to be grounded.

² See for the same notions especially the last part of Oswald Spengler, *Jahre der Entscheidung* (Munich 1933).

Is, for example, terrorism the new anarchism of the 21st century, and Muslim-fundamentalism a new form of nationalism or even fascism – in the opinion of the Bush administration – of the 21st century?

After 9-11, international terrorism has been regarded as one of the greatest challenges of the modern world. The problem is that the so-called 'War on Terror' has a strong resemblance to old ideological templates. "Constructing the Muslim Enemy" is the subtitle of a critical essay collection, in which it is stated that this contra-image was necessary after the vacuum that was created after the End of Cold War.³ In many ways, modern terrorism looks like an anachronism of the 21st century, as we can see the same belief in violence and the same belief that violence could really bring down the existing order.

The same questions about the possibility of ideology in the 21st century are to be asked in relation to religious fundamentalism. Despite its backward-looking emphasis and evident anti-modernism, religious fundamentalism is very much a creature of the modern world. Muslim-fundamentalism arises in deeply troubled societies, with crises like secularisation, post-colonialism and globalisation and general economic crises, and more and more open social conflict like nowadays in the Middle-East. A new aspect is the expressive militancy, and the predominantly eclectic use of the content orthodox religion. In that sense it could really be perceived as a new form of ideology.

Historical Questions

This introduction concludes with some historical questions and problems. Religion and ideology and the complex relation between religion and politics in many cases results in a redefinition of Christian tradition. Insufficient consideration has been given to the fact that Christian faith has successfully reinvented itself over the last two centuries. The tradition of the papacy in the second half of the nineteenth century, in which it presented itself -stated in the Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* - as a moral institution in the modern world, serves as an excellent illustration of this trend. This reinvention was closely linked to the Papal loss of worldly power after the unification of Italy in 1861.

³ Emran Qureshi, Michael A. Sells, *The New Crusades. Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York 2003).

The preaching of a Catholic social doctrine calls upon tradition, but clearly is a nineteenth century invention. Similar examples can be found in Protestantism. Even present day Muslim-fundamentalism claims to follow a tradition that in fact never existed, but at the most was a heretic movement within orthodox Islam.

The birth of political ideologies is usually traced back to the process through which the modern world came into existence. The process of modernisation had deep social, political and cultural dimensions. The modern ideologies are both products as agents of this process. But can we speak of ideologies before 1800? Class conflicts, class consciousness and utopian thought are not solely to be found in the West after 1800. Religious and political movements of the past had - not seldom - their roots in social conflicts and utopian concepts of society. Oswald Spengler in his *Decline of the West* interpreted the time of the Roman Republic as the last ideological struggle of the ancient culture, which ended with the principate of August. The time of the emperors is not only seen by him as 'posthistoire', but also as the end of ideology.

Ideologies are mostly interpreted as products of anonymous social-economic structural change. The role of individuals, especially ideologists, must not be underestimated. The personal biography (biographies?) of Marx and Engels has marked the history of communism. Engels was the son of a capitalist with industrial interests in Manchester. He became an eyewitness to social misery that could not be seen in Germany at that time. The industrialisation in Germany developed much later. Ideologists also had a personal interest in their writings. The first and most severe battle was fought against fellow riders. The personal, autobiographical influence on ideology is especially a topic in the case of Mussolini. Sometimes Italian fascism is referred to as Mussolinismo. His ideological opportunism is still subject to debate. Mao is another example, as he definitely used the pronunciation and articulation of Maoism for internal political goals, like his battle against the power of the party-bureaucracy and to spread a general fear.

Ideologies do not solely point at the future with utopian visions and political changes. They also utilise historical examples of an often idealised past. Frequently, the utopian consciousness of an Ideology constitutes a projection of this idealised past. This 'past' has to be shaped or even constructed.

The so-called 'Invention of Tradition' can be seen in many forms in nineteenth and twentieth century ideologies, not only in nationalism and conservatism, but in fascism and liberalism as well.

Ideology and Historicity

The one thing that all ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth century have in common is a new use of time dimensions. Present, past and future have had a far more pronounced meaning after the great Revolutions, more so than ever before. This coheres with the 'historisation' of the worldview since 1750, the radical new perception of the past as something profoundly different from the present. This cohered with the historicising of the world, in which thinking in historical categories like development and change in philosophy and science, which originated in the *Sattelzeit*, was prevalent. The idea of the past as something profoundly present, occurred here for the first time. Like Hegel's category of change, the *Kategorie der Veränderung*, the historical argument became dominant. The past itself was put forward as an argument. Whether this concerned a real history or an imaginary past seemed irrelevant. The development of human past, not the traditional contents, became the framework and central to the social and political discourse. History itself became central to modern ideological thought.

THE END OF HISTORY ?

Introduction by Bas Blaakman and Tom van Bruggen

In the several meetings we discussed Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*. In this book Fukuyama predicts the global triumph of democracy as the final form of human government. With the realisation of liberal democracy all over the world Fukuyama claims that there won't be evolution in ideologies anymore. Therefore the end of history is near.

The first day we introduced ourselves to each other: three people from Finland, one from Germany, one from Croatia and the two of us from the Netherlands. Two people from the wonderful and 'oldest' city of the Netherlands, Nijmegen joined us as well during two seminars. Our lecturer Ed Jonker gave an introduction into this subject. During the presentations the following topics were discussed: Belarus, Derrida and Francis of course.

After four exhausting meetings we had to prepare a final conclusion. Sitting in the park we wrote THE SONG. Later that night we achieved eternal fame by our phenomenal appearance on stage. The beautiful singing, combined with the enthusiastic dancing of one member of our group, made this evening an unforgettable event. Not just for us, but for all other ISHA members as well. Do you still remember it? The song Mandy by Barry Manilow...Sing along!

Ooh Francis,
You came and you gave us the answers.
A Liberal democracy to stay
But your ideas have faded away....
.....

CRITICAL COMMENTATORY TO FUKUYAMA

Jonas Ahlskog (University of Turku, Finland)

Introduction

In 1989 Francis Fukuyama published an article in *The National Interest* named "The End of History?". The article stirred up substantial scholarly debate, and when Fukuyama published his 400 page follow up book in 1992, titled *The End of History and the Last Man*, his status as one of the most discussed contemporary political theorists was affirmed. In the words of Alex Callinicos he had "almost single-handedly revived philosophical debate about the nature of history."⁴ Fukuyama's thesis has been both praised and criticized, and it is in the landscapes of the latter that this paper will dwell.

Fukuyama's arguments in *The End of History*⁵ are both intriguing and prophetically bombastic. In his view, the victory of liberal democracy signals the final station of mankind's ideological evolution, and the 'universalisation' of western liberal democracy results in the final form of human government. This is due to the fact that liberal democracy principally satisfies all human needs.

Fukuyama comes to this conclusion through an interesting unification of normative and empirical arguments. In my opinion, the refutation or confirmation for that matter, of Fukuyama's thesis cannot be made on primarily empirical grounds. Thus declaring empirical facts of current events, for example terrorism, as proof for the continuation of history will not serve as evidence against Fukuyama's argument. Rather, it will merely prove that the full extent of his thesis has not been understood.

⁴ Alex Callinicos, *Book Notes*, Political Studies Mar99, Vol. 47 Issue 1, 213.

⁵ His later work *The End of History and the Last Man* has elaborated and revised the arguments of his article. However, the principle theoretical framework of the first article is the same.

It is the aim of this paper to deal primarily with the normative part of Fukuyama's argument. This question precedes the empirical one, since the "End of History" presupposes that history has a conceivable end. My intention is to inquire after the necessary theoretical suppositions that his "End of History" thesis requires. This will be done by analysing and following the historicist Hegelian framework of Fukuyama's reasoning. My main question at issue is: does liberal democracy, as conceived by Fukuyama, constitute the end of history?

The Ambivalent End

Fukuyama understands history as a single, coherent evolutionary process that includes the experience of all peoples in all times.⁶ The historical process dictates the common evolutionary pattern⁷ for all human societies. Fukuyama views the past as a universal history of mankind with the direction of liberal democracy. This finalistic interpretation of history leads to what actually constitutes the end of history for Fukuyama: the perfection of Man's evolutionary consciousness in a liberal democracy.

Fukuyama states that "The triumph of the West, of the western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism."⁸ Fukuyama elaborates on this argument concerning the end of history, when he states that a better alternative to liberal democracy (meaning both a capitalist and democratic society) is unimaginable.⁹ This is a crucial feature of Fukuyama's argument, and Joseph McCarney claims that "inability to imagine alternatives is itself a large part of the substance of the belief that we in the contemporary West are living at the end of history."¹⁰

The end of history thesis contains one strikingly trivial problem; how can Fukuyama be sure that it is in fact liberal democracy that constitutes the end of the evolutionary process of history? The fact that any better alternative for the human society is essentially inconceivable sums up Fukuyama's rather undemanding answer. Now this simply isn't a satisfying answer to the question at

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (London 1992), 12.

⁷ Fukuyama is an historical idealist, i.e. this evolutionary pattern is the evolution of history through ideas.

⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, *The National Interest* 1989, 1.

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (London 1992), 46.

¹⁰ Joseph McCarney, *Shaping Ends: Reflections on Fukuyama*, *New Left Review* 1/202, 1993, 38.

hand. His claim appears to be an academic way of saying merely that 'I don't know what the future holds in store for humanity, but *I do know* that it cannot be better than our present situation'. This essentially nonsensical idealist speculation conveys the same factual relevance as speculations about the possibilities of men being the spawns of aliens, or if death is being succeeded by a utopist fluffy existence among white clouds. Statements of this nature can by virtue of their logic neither be denied nor proved.

However, Fukuyama is not ignorant about the vague status of his proclamation of the end of history: "Nor can we in the final analysis know, provided a majority of the wagons eventually reach the same town, whether their occupants, having looked around a bit at their new surroundings, will not find them inadequate and set their eyes on a new and more distant journey."¹¹. Hence Fukuyama is uncertain whether the end of history constitutes the end of Man's evolutionary process. Nonetheless, it seems plausible, maintaining Fukuyama's claims about "a new and more distant journey", that the present evolutionary process of human society will end in liberal democracy. Yet Fukuyama seems reluctant to actually proclaim this as the end of evolution as such. There is some tension in Fukuyama's argument supporting the idea of the end of history. He is assuming that liberal democracy is the end of history, but he cannot conclude that it actually is the end of all progress. This ambivalence is present throughout Fukuyama's entire argument. Because of this inconsistency Daniel Herwitz describes Fukuyama's agenda in a rather satirical way:

¹¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (London 1992), p. 339.

“Francis Fukuyama’s well known view is that history has come to an end, or is about to come to an end, or is in the process of coming to an end in most parts of the globe but perhaps not most, or is in the process of coming to an end in some but not all other places on the globe while some of those parts of the globe that seem about to be coming to an end may well slide back towards the beginning into less adequate historical shapes, others remaining perhaps for some time to come mired in the historical mud but, one hopes, over time rising the occasion of liberal democracy and so coming to completion”¹².

This is remarkably reminiscent of another dialectical thinker who was uncertain of what contemporary events meant in the context of the greater historical process. My thoughts are leading to Karl Marx who, in the 1850’s, wrote about the likely end of the mutiny in India; that one can get away from being proven wrong by mixing in a bit of dialectics in the argument.¹³ Even when disregarding Fukuyama’s ambivalence, his end of history thesis needs a closer examination when doing justice to his arguments and questioning its philosophical underpinnings is wishful. The end of all progress or not, Fukuyama has some rather insightful thoughts on what history is and what its end would mean. An assessment of this requires a closer analysis of Fukuyama’s idea of history as a coherent evolutionary process.

The Dialectics of Recognition

In Fukuyama’s view, history is a universally coherent evolutionary process driven by essentially two mechanisms. The first mechanism is the logic of natural science, a system resulting in ever changing production possibilities, of which capitalism is the most efficient manifestation. The second mechanism is derived from classical Hegelian dialectics. This other mechanism is the actual *primus motor* of historical progress, and it consists of the age-old struggle of human beings for recognition. In my analysis I will elaborate on the latter, since it is the fulfilment of recognition that associates the end of history with Fukuyama’s vision of liberal democracy.

¹² Daniel Herwitz, *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History*, South African Journal of Philosophy, vol. 19, Issue 3, 2000, 34.

¹³ Francis Wheen, *How Mumbo-Jumbo Conquered the World*, (London 2004), 92. I am paraphrasing Wheen’s argument.

According to Fukuyama, Man is a “being that works and struggles over pure prestige”¹⁴. Evidently, Fukuyama has a very clear understanding of what human nature is: “the transhistorical concept of Man as a being that seeks and is satisfied by recognition.”¹⁵. This desire is an inherently human feature of our worldly existence, it resides in everyone’s soul and is called *Thymos*.

This desire for recognition is framed within Hegelian master-slave dialectic. Hence everyone craving recognition, according to the thesis. Alienation is its antithesis, and full recognition of “man as man” is the synthesis and will subsequently end the age-old desire for recognition. To Hegel this is the development of consciousness: in Fukuyama’s anthropologic understanding¹⁶ of this dialectic full recognition will result in the end of historical progress. Fukuyama then knits this metaphysical argument about human nature together with certain events in the history of ideas. He identifies the French and American revolutions with an ushering of universal recognition, of which universal suffrage and freedom of speech is decisive, through the acknowledgment of equality between human beings. Accordingly, liberal democracy being the contemporary embodiment of those revolutionary ideals will be the end since “It most fully (though not completely) ¹⁷ satisfies the most basic human longings, and therefore can be expected to be more universal and more durable than other regimes or other principles of political organization.”¹⁸. This aspect of Fukuyama’s argument cannot be overemphasized, as Fred Halliday writes: “Fukuyama’s whole argument rests upon a theory of the human mind, and of the contradictory impact of the desire for ‘recognition’, *thymos*.”¹⁹.

¹⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *Reflections on the End of History, 5 Years Later*, History and Theory 2/34, 1995. 38.

¹⁵ Ibid, 38.

¹⁶ An understanding very much influenced by the French political philosopher Alexandre Kojève.

¹⁷ Here Fukuyama is taking into consideration an idea he already developed in his 1989 article. Namely the “prospect of boredom at the end of history”(Fukuyama, 1989). That people will literally be bored out of their minds when the age-old struggle is over. However, this feature is a result of his idea of human nature, not a primary factor in its historical development. Hence this idea of “boredom” will not be further explored in this essay.

¹⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *Reflections on the End of History, 5 Years Later*, History and Theory 2/34, 1995. 29.

¹⁹ Fred Halliday, *An Encounter with Fukuyama*, New Left Review 1/193, 1992, 89.

This central point of Fukuyama's argument makes it almost immune to any empirical refutation of liberal democracy being the end of history. Therefore, Fukuyama sees the end of history primarily in the principles of liberal democracy, not in its current manifestation in different political regimes. Problems in democracies like the United States, France or Switzerland are first and foremost problems of implementation: "But these problems were ones of incomplete implementation of the twin principles of liberty and equality on which modern democracy is founded, rather than on flaws in the principles themselves."²⁰ Consequently, the problem of the contemporary world does not lie in the structure or the principles of liberal democracy. Rather, these problems are the results of not having enough of liberal democracy. This is very evident in the distinction Fukuyama makes between a problem and a contradiction with regards to the world order: "It is not sufficient to point to "problems" in contemporary liberal democracies, even if they are serious ones like budget deficits, inflation, crime or drugs. A "problem" does not become a contradiction unless it is so serious that it not only cannot be solved within the system, but corrodes the legitimacy of the system itself such that the latter collapses under its own weight."²¹

Subsequently, what is called a "contradiction" and what is called a "problem" will be crucial to whether or not liberal democracy constitutes the end of history.²² Fukuyama constantly claims that liberal democracy is without contradiction and that the ideals or "the Meal of liberal democracy could not be improved on."²³ I will now consider two issues concerning this normative argument. There are several conflicting issues of Fukuyama's thesis, but I have chosen one logical and one factual regarding liberal democracy as the principal end of history. For the sake of argument I will accept Fukuyama's Hegelian view of human nature and historical progress. Nonetheless, these two issues still remain: does history in fact end with the satisfaction of *Thymos*, and would Fukuyama's view of liberal democracy be a sufficient satisfaction of it?

²⁰ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 11.

²¹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 136.

²² See Daniel Herwitz *Francis Fukuyama and the End of History* for an in depth analysis of this conceptual distinction.

²³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 11.

The End and Equal Recognition

Fukuyama's normative argument is "the principles of freedom of equality that underlay the French and American revolutions, to the effect that they stand at the end of a long process of ideological evolution, and that there is no higher set of alternative principles that will in time replace them."²⁴ Liberal democracy constitutes the end of history since it provides a fully satisfying recognition of Man. According to Fukuyama, liberal democracy recognizes all human beings universally "by granting and protecting their rights"²⁵. Recognition, for instance through universal suffrage and freedom of speech, is granted reciprocally in liberal democracy since the state grants its citizens rights and they abide by the state laws.²⁶ The first problem that arises is a logical one, deriving from Fukuyama's dialectical theory of history. How can the age-old innately human desire (*Thymos*) be satisfied through universal recognition?

In my view, the problem Fukuyama is confronted with, and he is very well aware of it, is the issue of the almost irreconcilable concepts of recognition and universality. The question to ask Fukuyama is "whether recognition that can be universalised is worth having in the first place and whether the quality of recognition may not be far more important than its universality."²⁷ Now Fukuyama has a peculiar, but not adequate, way of getting out of this predicament. Since 'great men' will not be pleased with the recognition provided by citizenship they will just quest for a more profound recognition. These 'great men' would not be a contradiction or worthy of contempt in liberal democracy.²⁸ Still, this does not lead Fukuyama away from all problems. To the concept of recognition in its dialectical context is dependent of its logical antithesis, namely non-recognition. Since one is always recognized against the background of someone not being recognized, i.e. recognition receives its meaning in relation to its conceptual opposite. Hence,

²⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *Reflections on the End of History, 5 Years Later*, History and Theory 2/34, 1995. 30.

²⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 202.

²⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 203.

²⁷ Joseph McCarney, *Shaping Ends: Reflections on Fukuyama*, New Left Review 1/202, 1993, 42.

²⁸ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 25.

Fukuyama's example of 'great men' would in fact be a continuation of history, since their higher recognition would become the new standard of recognition and ordinary recognition within liberal democracy would become obsolete.

There is another feature of recognition that is problematic for Fukuyama's identification of liberal democracy with the end of history: Recognition seems to be dependent on equality. One must remember that when Fukuyama speaks of "liberal democracy" it is synonymous with capitalist democracy. The ultimate question to ask about universal recognition handles the socio-economic inequalities capitalism is based on. An interesting element (never use thing in an essay) about the dialectic struggle for recognition, in Fukuyama's case based on a Hegelian master-slave relation, is that it cannot be made by unequal recognisers. As the Hegelian scholar Joseph McCarney concludes: "In between the quality of recognition varies inversely with the inequality of recognizers. The point may be put more formally by saying that equality is a condition of the possibility of recognition proper."²⁹

Unless recognition is a "self-determined mutual recognition of equals" it is in fact no recognition at all. Capitalism as a system for economic organization means that "a relatively small class of people who own and control the means of industrial, commercial, and financial activity, as well as a major part of the means of communication: these people thereby exercise a totally disproportionate amount of influence on politics and society both in their own countries and lands far beyond their own borders."³⁰ Consequently, it does not appear evident that liberal (capitalist) democracy provides the basis of equality that makes universal recognition possible. McCarney does indeed imply that the egalitarian aspect of the concept of recognition, if followed to where it actually heads, does not lead to liberal democracy but classless society.³¹ This would be the only society that could sufficiently provide universal recognition.

²⁹ Joseph McCarney, *Shaping Ends: Reflections on Fukuyama*, New Left Review 1/202, 1993, 51.

³⁰ Ralph Miliband, *Fukuyama and the Socialist Alternative*, New Left Review 1/193, 1992, 109.

³¹ Joseph McCarney, *Shaping Ends: Reflections on Fukuyama*, New Left Review 1/202, 1993, 51.

Fukuyama is not ignorant towards these problems of unequal recognition. In fact, he admits that “economic inequality brought about by capitalism *ipso facto* implies unequal recognition.”³². Fukuyama’s approach to answer this question is of great incoherence and ambivalence. Sometimes he seems to be implying that these inequalities could be resolved within another socioeconomic system³³, and occasionally he is implying that the inequalities of men are just old conventions. This is evident when he claims that post-war America had in a way reached “classless society” and that existing inequalities were “due to the nature of things rather than the will of man”³⁴. With this statement it appears as Fukuyama tries to say that everyone is recognized through formal equality in liberal democracy. That simply evades the question of equality, since it is not formal equality that is needed for recognition, but actual and real equality. Nevertheless, he provides very fragile answers to a question that is challenging his whole ‘end of history’ thesis based on the universal recognition of man in liberal democracy.

Conclusion

In this paper I have, by examining the theoretical arguments, tried to show that Fukuyama’s idealistic and historicist view of history does not result in his conclusive “end of history” thesis. On the contrary, comparing these ideas to a classless society, it seems as if liberal democracy is a very unsatisfactory candidate for “the end of history” title. In my opinion it is not very likely that Fukuyama, being a well-read and prominent scholar, is unaware of the inequalities of liberal democracy. Rather, it seems like Fukuyama is very eager to see liberal democracy as the end of history. The consequent problems of this view are disregarded as details or issues that will disappear through proper implementation of the principles of liberal democracy.

I consider this to be the most hazardous part of Fukuyama’s argument. For his identification of liberal democracy with the end of history most definitely has a political undertone. Fukuyama’s end of history thesis legitimises liberal (capitalist) democracy by making it the result of historical progress and necessity. That is not to say that liberal democracy is necessarily a ‘bad’ thing.

³² Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 289.

³³ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 289.

³⁴ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, 291.

Yet, Fukuyama's use of the concepts "liberal democracy" is so ambiguous that it would basically fit any political regime formally abiding by the ideals of the French and American revolutions. In this sense, his thesis is an affirmation of status quo and an instrument against political alternatives. In my opinion, Fukuyama's achievement does not lie within his contributions to the contemporary political debate. Rather, it is his actualisation of questions regarding the philosophy of history.

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IDEOLOGIES IN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY

Introduction by Adriejan van Veen and Maarten Paulusse

Liberalism, conservatism and Socialism: Ideologies of the 19th and 20th century? This study group focused on the development of two of the most influential ideologies of the 19th and 20th century: liberalism and socialism. We took a closer look at the origin of both ideologies, as well as the position they have in the contemporary political landscape.

Liberalism flourished in times of Revolution. The French as well as the American Revolutions clearly show liberal characteristics. Now it seems as if liberalism is the only ideology left in the West. Even former socialist societies have embraced democratic values. But how far can the liberalism of the 21st century be compared with the liberalism that existed 100 years ago? Is neo-liberalism still liberalism? The origins of socialism can be found in the reaction to industrialization in Europe and Great Britain characterizes the main features of this reaction. However, the “founders” of the ideology are two Germans: Marx and Engels. The development of the Marxist ideology has been a turbulent one with branches that extend in radical as well as more democratic directions. Today, social democracy appears to be the most fruitful branch and one that has the most far reaching influence, particularly in Europe. What remains of social democracy? Does Blair deserve to carry the name of foreman of this ideology? And what happened to the “Third Road” of Blair and Clinton? Was this just a phenomenon of the 1990s?

The final question is, of course, what remains from the old ideologies. Is there still a distinction between them or are people trying to conceal the fact that everyone has become a liberal?

ADOLF HITLER AND IDEOLOGY OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

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Influences and prerequisites for movement development

Any work about Adolf Hitler's ideas and Ideology of National Socialism would be impossible without comparing the ideas in Germany which were popular during the XIX century and before WWI, and which could have been an influence on the newly created Movement. It is also very important to understand which kind of nationalistic ideas developed after WWI as a reaction to the outcome of the war and to the constantly growing danger of the bolshevism.³⁵

Nationalism, pan-Germanism and racism

In their publications, Claude David and Marvin Perry³⁶ made a concept of a vast variety of ideas and intellectuals who were in some way predecessors of the atmosphere in which the National Socialist movement was created. It is possible to follow the basic development of the mainstream ideas in Germany through the 19th century. German nationalism, as the nationalism of other European nations, was expanding after the Napoleonic wars. It eventually transformed into pan-Germanism which was greatly influenced by Social Darwinism and racist ideas. It thus developed into the idea of a superior race.

Nationalists wanted a country with linguistic borders, not with natural borders. In other words, they wanted their country to lay borders over the entire territory where Germans were settled. They also demanded education which would have provided unity of the nation, by which it was meant that objectivity in education should have been replaced with *uniform* knowledge, *one* state of spirit and *one*

³⁵ As this is only student presentation, in the paper have been used the analyses and conclusions made by the historians: Andrej Mitrovic, Claude David and Marvin Perry.

³⁶ Claude David, *Hitler and Nazism*, Belgrade 1999:50-60

Marvin Perry, *An Intellectual History of Modern Europe*, Belgrade 2000, 337-344, 483-490.

character. After the establishment of Bismarck's Reich, nationalism was transformed into the pan-Germanism. The borders of that state became too small for the nationalists. They thought it was the right time for the creation of the Reich with linguistic borders, as it was stated in the 'Speeches to the German Nation' from Johann Gottlieb Fichte in 1807/08.

On the other hand there was a strong desire for the creation of the state on the German base which meant rediscovering of the German roots and consequently the rejection of the Roman law and reestablishment of the German common law, rejection of the Christianity and reestablishment of the German pagan religion. But these ideas were too romantic and they could not be realized. Greater influence on the string of ideas had a connection with Social Darwinism and the pan-Germanism. Social-Darwinists were using biological theories of Darwin to explain the functioning of the society. This led them to the conclusion that there is a constant fight in and between societies, a fight which only the strongest and best could win. This struggle erased humanity from the human relationships and war was to be recognized as the best thing for the development of the nation. They recognized superior and inferior races and their race struggle is a stipulation for the human development.

Social-Darwinism created the idea of existent of superior races³⁷: the Anglo-Saxon and the Teutonic race. Social Darwinism was strongly influenced by Arthur Gobineau and Huston Stewart Chamberlain, two very popular race theoreticians in Germany. Gobineau concluded that there are three races, which he put in a hierarchical order: the white, yellow and black race. There were only differences in physiognomy and intellectual development between them. Chamberlain made a step forward by the pronunciation of the differences in moral sense. In this way he could have made differences between the German and the Jewish race, even though both of them were part of the white race. Chamberlain also "proved" that Christ was not a Jew and that Jews and Germans are two dialectical opposites that were in a struggle for historical importance. Both of the

³⁷ These ideas were popular before and in early stage of the WWI. The idea of Anglo-Saxon race was popular in British Empire and idea of Teutonic race was popular in the German Reich.

theoreticians were very popular in German intellectual circles.³⁸

National-socialism and fascism

For the understanding of the National Socialist movement it is essential to have an insight into the main national movements which were created right after the Great War. The two most important movements were Fascism and National Socialism. Historian Andrej Mitrovic made a comparative study of these two ideas, their beginnings and their development³⁹, in order to understand similarities of and differences between these movements. Some of his results are important for this essay.

Both the fascist and national-socialistic party programs were the national programs which had some socialist aspects, because of the situation in Europe at the time when these parties were created. Similarities between these two programs are as follow: (i) both programs were based on the national ideas; (ii) both glorified the war which had just ended; (iii) both pledged for homogenization of the nation by integration of the workers into the movement and nation itself, as the class which cooperates with the industrials. Although they had some spearheads in their program which were in the favor of the workers, none of these points in the program was calling for changing of the society. Instead of asking for change in the society, they were asking for the unity of the nation and all parts of the society.⁴⁰

The differences between movements were as follows: (i) national-socialists had racism, especially, anti-Semitism, as one of the main ideas, but in the fascist movement racism and anti-Semitism were not so strong before 1938; (ii) while the national-socialists thought that a pure-blooded nation is the foundation for their system, the fascists thought that the state is the base of their system. This led to the institutionalization of the fascist movement in the existing state institutions, and it led to the parallelism between the state and the party in a national socialistic system, in spite of all the efforts towards the direction of "nazification" of the state. "Italy under fascism was a

³⁸ They were praised by the Richard Wagner and his Bayeruth intellectual circle, H. S. Chamberlain was even the member of the same society, his second wife was daughter of Richard Wagner, he was close friend and associate of Kaiser Wilchlem II and in 1926. he met Adolf Hitler.

³⁹ Andrej Mitrovic, *Fascism and Nazism*, Belgrade 1979.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 11-14.

monarchy (...) and the king was the formal representative of the state sovereignty (...) but [the] Duce was the most powerful person in the state (...) In Germany things were different, especially when Reichspräsident Von Hindenburg died. The titles which Hitler took, notably Führer and Reichskanzelar, show us the parallels between the state and party, fundamentally united in the person of the Führer.”⁴¹

The NSDAP was not the first party that tried to merge nationalistic and socialistic ideas into one coherent ideology. There were some similar parties in Austro-Hungary and in the German Reich before WWI, but this idea became popular in Germany between 1904 and 1918, when there were several national-socialistic parties established besides the NSDAP⁴². All of them had connections with the NSDAP from the very beginning of their existence. They were all based on the ideas of nationalism, anticommunism, antisocialism, anti-Liberalism and anti-Semitism.⁴³

The goals of new ideology and their implementation

In this setting the NSDAP was developed under the firm hand of Adolf Hitler, but many of its ideas were old or borrowed and reshaped into a new ideology. Beside Hitler, the most important ideologist was Gottfried Feder, who wrote the party program in 25 points and Alfred Rosenberg, who wrote the book “Myth about the twentieth century”.

25 Points

The party program, also known as the 25 Points, was introduced to the public in the Hofbräuhaus brewery on 25 February 1920 in Munich. Hitler was a reviewer of this program, and he stated it as a one of the fundamental documents of the Movement.⁴⁴ Analyses of this program show us the goals of this ideology:

Union of all Germans into one state in which non-Germans would not own citizenship, but would be treated as aliens. Furthermore: imperialism for new Lebensraum. These goals were explained in the first 7 points of the program, which confirms that these were the two

⁴¹ Ibid, 42.

⁴² German National Socialistic Party in Czechoslovakia, German National Socialistic Party in Wien, German Socialistic Party in Germany.

⁴³ Andrej Mitrovic, 23.

⁴⁴ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Belgrade 2004, 300

main goals of the ideology. At no. 9 and 10 the desire for the homogenization of the nation was expressed. Social questions were elaborated in points no. 11-17, and some of them were very familiar with communist rhetoric.

Point no. 23 elaborated how a newspaper could have worked as one of the main means of propaganda. This point shows high concern about the future propaganda in the new state, which national socialists wanted to create. Point no. 25 explained the order of the new centralistic state, which shows the intention that central authority would rule the federal authority, and that the party leaders would be responsible for the carrying out of all the parties and state programs, which means that they would be the main authority in the country. The other points briefly report on the attitudes about national health care, new ways of educating younger generations for all needs of the state, and the desire for abolishing the Roman law and constituting, again, the German common law.

As Hitler explained in *Mein Kampf* and *Zweite Buch*⁴⁵, only a strong and united nation can expect respect from the other European countries. As he was expecting to unite all Germans into one state and to conquer new *Lebensraum*, he needed a strong and united German nation. The main goal of the program and ideas about Policy of the Interior Affairs was to create the base for the Policy of the Foreign Affairs.

Party supporters and enemies

Hitler knew that the main problem for gaining power would be the Marxists and social-democrats. Thus he created a strategy against them, and formulated: "If social-democracy would oppose new teaching of better quality, but with the same brutality in conducting, then this new teaching will win, albeit after the hardest fight."⁴⁶ Hitler came to the conclusion that he must not oppose the Marxists new party, but offer the new general view and new movement instead,⁴⁷ which would be at the same time put in the use of masses, through social points in program and propaganda; intellectuals, by means of connecting ideology, science and religion, by creating a new common base with party and goals to fight against same enemy.⁴⁸

The Führer explained that he does not want to weaken the "national front" against communists by creating another national

⁴⁵ *Zweite Buch* was never published during the life of Führer, and he never gave the title for this book, so it is known as *Zweite Buch* (Second Book) and *Secret Book* of Adolf Hitler.

⁴⁶ Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Belgrade 2004, 38.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 78.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 81.

party which will fight with other national parties for the votes, rather he wants to weaken the "red front" by taking their votes and their members, the workers. So the social part of the National Socialistic ideology had a double role to attract workers for this movement and to create a good base for the united nation. This kind of a united nation was possible only in those states where there was no possibility for the workers to unite with workers from other countries throughout the Marxist and social-democratic parties.⁴⁹ For the strong movement which Hitler wanted to create, he knew that he needed the support from the small bourgeoisies, to enable the victories in political struggles: "Members [he spoke about the small bourgeoisies] who are hard to be shaken by whatsoever means that they are as ready for sacrifices as they are full of resisting the bellicose strength."⁵⁰

Now it is obvious that the party program offered goals with diverse attempts, those which were dedicated to the questions of better living for the small bourgeoisies and the farm workers, on one hand, and those for the workers, on the other hand. The real attempt was to solve the problems of the small bourgeoisies and the farm workers who were the first party members, and who were traditionally supporters of the national ideas, and to use a goal as a propaganda message for the workers to join the movement. As wealthy industrials start to support the NSDAP, the struggle and propaganda for the worker's rights started to lose its intensity.⁵¹

New state and its education

A united nation can not be strong without a good state system. This system was partly explained at point no. 25 of the party program. Hitler also wanted to destroy the local patriotism of the German states which were part of the Weimar republic. For these purposes he declared the next principle: "National Socialism must (...) put upon the entire German nation, no matter of the today borders of the federal borders of German states, its principles and to continue education based on its ideas and conceptions. The same way the churches are not obliged with national borders, the same way national-socialistic ideas are not obliged with federal borders of our German states.

⁴⁹ Ibid, passim.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 97.

⁵¹ Claude David, 43-44.

National-socialistic teaching is no servant to the single federal state, but it should become master of the entire German nation."⁵² This is the idea of the centralistic state where the party has a unifying task and has centripetal strength which can hold this structure as one coherent creation. Thus there would have been no separatist or local-patriotic ideas, in any of the federal states, which could damage or destroy the unity of the entire nation.

Education of the young generation of a united German nation must have been different, from the education which existed in Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Second German Reich and in Weimar Republic, according to Hitler's plan. New education would have only made up 10% of the school material in that period and the free time would have been used for the physical exercises. In this 10% of the school material, technical knowledge would be preferred by the educational authorities. Hitler thought that he could manage to accomplish this if the new school system taught the young people how to read and learn: "The art of reading as well as learning is this: important data should be kept and unimportant data should be forgotten."⁵³ From this plan for the new educational system it was obvious that the young generation would be prepared for the tasks which the state ordered them to do. The two main tasks from the state were a better industrial production, which was the reason why the technical education was important, and the military service, which formed the argument behind the importance of physical readiness.

Racism and anti-Semitism

Another important part of the National-socialist ideology is racism and anti-Semitism. This was very important for many members and ideologist of the party. Beside Hitler, there was another great racist ideologist: Alfred Rosenberg. He wrote the book "Myth about the twentieth century (1931)". In this book, Rosenberg even further developed the ideas of H. S. Chamberlain's book "Base of the nineteenth century (1899)". He presented history as a constant struggle between Arians and non-Arians. This idea was also familiar to Hitler, and there was a great analogy with the communist idea of constant struggle between the classes.

In my opinion it was an idea which opposed the Marxist

⁵² Ibid, 369.

⁵³ Ibid, 19

ideology. Not only did they oppose the idea of the constant class struggle with the idea of a national unity where all classes are cooperating; they also created the idea of constant struggle between Arians and non-Arians. That really meant that there was no fight between the members of the same nation, which could have helped to establish the international unity of the working classes, and the unity which could have helped the nation to win the international and interracial struggle. With these kinds of explanations national-socialists and Marxists could easily explain problems of the past, today's problems and promise a better future.

Richard Breiting stated during second conversation with Adolf Hitler: "But Mr. Hitler, you shouldn't recognize everywhere a Jewish plot."⁵⁴ The Führer put the blame on the Jews for everything which in his opinion was wrong in the World or in the German society. He blamed them for: Standing behind Marxist and Social-democrats. Creating the Internationalism, which allows races to easily mix together, thus creating descendants of lower racial quality which in turn allows the Jews to dominate over these descendants. Deceiving citizenship and controlling most of their newspapers. Creating the parliamentary system with all its faults, and in that parliament they manage to oppose the idea of the majority against the idea of leaders which were chosen from the best citizens of the state. Being responsible for the breakdown of the Reich in WWI, and together with Slavs they were responsible for the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Jewish world plot being responsible for every problem in the world. Their art, which represented everything disliked by the National-Socialist. Being responsible for numerous diseases like syphilis, cholera etc.

All these ideas were very often mentioned in Hitler's books, and the more he was mentioning them the stronger was his will for a brutal problem solving. Richard Breiting realised, after only two conversations he had with the future Führer, that Hitler's hate against the Jews was not just pure propaganda,: "Now I am convinced that he will – if he gets to power – persecute Jews. His tirades, full of rebuke, against Jews are not any kind of maneuvers of frightening... Albert Einstein is for him, also an alien. What a crazy idea!"⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Eduard Calic, Hitler without mask, Pula 1985, 66

⁵⁵ Ibid, 94

Foreign Policy

One of the most important topics of the National-socialist ideology was the rebirth of a mighty Germany, after conquering countries and territories, which Adolf Hitler and other ideologists thought they either rightfully belonged to Germany or were necessary for the further German development. How important foreign policy was for Hitler shows the fact that he dedicated almost his whole *Zweite Buch* to this topic. Also, some important ideologist, like Feder in 25 Points, did not involve their work in this field, and in that way they gave the Führer carte blanche for creating a whole new idea.

Although Hitler did not have any detailed plans for a foreign policy which he was realizing, he had some general principles and when he came to power he tried to create a foreign policy, according to this policy. He stated: "By that we, national-socialist, are willingly finishing with the direction of the pre-war foreign policy. We continue where it was stopped before six centuries. We are halting the never ending campaigns of Germans in Southern and Western Europe, and we are looking for the land in East. We are ending, finally, colonial and world trade policy of the prewar period and we are beginning with the policy of the future land. But when we today speak about new land in Europe, we could think primly on Russia and her neighbor countries."⁵⁶ Hitler was quite aware which country was the greatest opposition: "Germany should never forget for a moment that regardless how, and along which ways, she thinks to change her fate, France will be her enemy, and that France from the outset can count on any combination of powers that turns against Germany."⁵⁷

First of his two main aims was to unite all Germans into one Homeland, as it was also stated in the 25 Points, and until this goal has not been reached Hitler did not want any other plans and goals in his foreign policy: "As long as German views the maintenance of the freedom and independence of our Folk as the supreme aim of her foreign policy and wants to secure this Folk the prerequisite for its daily life, for so long will its foreign policy think to be determined by our Folk's territorial need. And for so long will we not be able to have any internal or external inducement to fall into enmity with a State which does not in the least stand obstructively in our way."⁵⁸

⁵⁶ *Mein Kampf*, 421.

⁵⁷ Adolf Hitler, *Zweite Buch*, from: www.adolfhitler.ws/lib/books/zweites/zweites.htm

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 142.

But for the fulfillment of this task he did not recognize any of that day country borders: "... no people on this earth poses any quadrate meter of land by some ultimate authority and by ultimate law. Like the borders of Germany are temporarily borders of the present-day situation in political struggle, so are the borders of the Lebensraum of other peoples."⁵⁹

The Führer explained his plans for the fulfillment of this task to Breiting during their second conversation in June 1931: "Of course, I demand returning of Austria into the Reich and also including those parts of Czechoslovakia where German language is the only spoken language, Sudetenland. I am wondering how I shall recognise, the part of Switzerland where German language is only spoken language, this integrations. You know as well as I, that Zürich, Basel and Bern are German towns... Belgium is one monstrous-state in which religion and monarchy are trying to save the balance between Flemings and Walloons, but Flemings speak the same language which is spoken in Netherlands, but this separation of two German lands is maintained by the religion and monarchy. We did not forget Alsace-Lorraine."⁶⁰

The next goal was to conquer new Lebensraum in the East. For the fulfillment of this task Hitler thought the best allies would be Italy and England. He thought that Germany should become the most powerful state in continental Europe, that Italy should dominate in the Mediterranean area and the British Empire should remain the main colonial power on the other continents. This idea shows how little Hitler understood of the vital interests of the British Empire. He did not realize that the Mediterranean area was main the route to India and that it therefore was "the most precious jewel in crown of Queen of England" . Also, he did not realize that one of the main goals in foreign policy of the British Empire was the balance of the continental powers in Europe. In the alliance with these two countries he thought that he would have the freedom to conquer the East without worrying about the French reaction, thus avoiding a war on two fronts.

Conclusion

For the fulfillment of his foreign policy Hitler needed a strong and united German nation, so he did everything he could to achieve this

⁵⁹ *Mein Kampf*, 419.

⁶⁰ Eduard Calic, 76

prerequisite: (i) he created a centralistic state in which federal states lost their authority and on top of this system was the Führer himself with the highest authorities in internal and foreign affairs; (ii) he created a one-party system and destroyed all the syndicates which were, for many years, one of the strongest means of the Marxist way of political struggle; (iii) better working conditions were offered to farmer workers and the small bourgeoisies, but this did not solve all their problems; (iv) created a Reich's Arbeitsdienst (Reichs Working Service) which was very similar to his ideas of union of workers and their employers, but they were not fighting for their personal causes, they were cooperating for a better production in the state economy. The main purpose of this economy was the preparation for the future war, as it was clearly stated in the Four Years Plan, Hermann Göring (a German ace pilot of WWI and the commander of the new established Luftwaffe) was responsible for the fulfillment of this. This fact shows us how important this plan was for the military plans; and (v) physical education was the most important part of the education of the young generation, and all youth organizations were put under control of the NSDAP. Also Hitler brutally, as he has promised, confronted all his political and racial enemies.

After these preparations the Führer tried to reach all of his goals in foreign policy, but he only partly succeeded to fulfill some of his intentions: "The struggle for regaining the German freedom will thereby again raise German history to the level of world history." But he did not achieve his main goals in foreign policy, so this could be the only field of his work where he did not manage to realize all of his ideas.

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IDEOLOGIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

Introduction by Christie Miedema and Ditte van Dulmen Krumpelman

The evidence from Eastern Europe shows that confronting communism has not been an easy task. Liberalism prevailed in 1989, but the transition from a guided economy to a free market economy has been harder than expected. Fifteen years after the fall of communism there is still a certain nostalgia for the communist period typified by the German word '*ostalgie*'. There is no desire to return to the communist period but the nostalgia shows that liberal values are not fully accepted. There is a significant difference between Central Europe and the Balkans. Central Europe seems to have embraced liberal values, while in the Balkan countries ethnic struggles, popular collectivism, and plebiscite democracies characterize recent the history of the region. The post-communist world is characterized by splintered identities. Is there a need to return to ideology? The question then arises - can liberalism offer an ideological alternative or do we need another worldview? Is a new ideology the right solution for Eastern Europe?

EASTERN EUROPE AND COMMUNISM

IMPACT OF COMMUNISTIC HERITAGE ON JOURNALISM AND THE MASS MEDIA IN SERBIA

Leonida Matajic (University of Belgrade, Serbia)

Introduction

The starting point for this paper is research on the relation between the media (i.e. means of communication) that a nation makes use of and the way that those means contribute the formation of society, economy, politics and culture of the nation in question. This research is carried out at the beginning of 1950's by Harold Innis and Marshal McLuhan who were the first modern scientists interested in this problem. After this research in the scientific world the only dispute was about whether media affected society more or if it was in fact vice versa.

My intention is to indicate and describe all changes that arose in the domain of the media in Serbia¹ after the fall of communism and political reforms (establishment of multiparty system) carried out in Serbia in the same time as in the rest of Eastern Europe, between 1989-1990, as well as to show how strong the communist heritage influenced these developments in Serbian society.

Brief look at the position of the media in communism

The mass media during communism, like in every totalitarian political system, were controlled by the state. Consequently, their primary task was to propagate the official ideology instead of informing citizens objectively. Censorship was very strict and, as one of the most important "guardians of the system", the media were being used in the struggle between internal and external enemies. Nevertheless, in Yugoslavia these characteristics were less expressive because of the specific Yugoslav version of communism, which was not so repressive and gave its citizens a certain amount of freedom.

Serbian society in the period 1990-2000.

The process of crisis, destroying and after that, the disappearance of socialism was specific for each Eastern European country. In Serbia social transformation started with constitutional changes in March 1989. The new constitution came into effect in July 1990 and it predicted multiparty elections. The adjective "socialist" was deleted from the official name of the republic.

The post-communist period is best described by the famous Serbian sociologist Svetozar Stojanovic as a "mixture of communism, pre-communism and capitalism which differ from country to country and the final result depends on which of these tendencies will prevail."¹ In Serbia it was again the socialist option embodied in the Socialist Party of Serbia whose president, after elections held in December 1990, was elected for president of the republic. His political opponents challenged the regularity of the elections. This situation caused conflict between different political parties regarding the further development of Serbia, meaning which direction this development should take. Either towards building a liberal-democratic society, which will be fully integrated in the Western world, or some kind of officially democratic and multiparty, but in fact, authoritarian society which was the idea of the SPS leaders. This conflict, together with civil war, escalated in former Yugoslavia, which enabled president Milosevic and his party to win every election in the period between 1990-2000¹. In this way he could rule the country in an authoritarian way and democracy only existed as a formality.

In what way was this situation reflected in the domain of media, which is in our field of interest? In order to see that, it is necessary to make a general survey of it. At the beginning of the 1990's the Serbian mass media existed out of three television stations, respectively TV Beograd, TV Novi Sad and TV Pristina. They were founded by regional principle and the founder was the state. The national radio station was also founded by the state while local authorities founded local radio stations.¹ Firms that published newspapers were in public property as well, but they maintained from selling which gave the press a more independent position in comparison to media which were financed completely from the budget.

During president Milosevic's rule RTS (National Radio & Television) was used in the similar way as it was used in the communistic period. The official policy was being broadcasted instead of providing information serving the public. In time, private television and radio stations were founded but the frequency of grants depended on the estimated future political orientation. Media which favored the opposition were often closed and coerced into paying huge fines according to the regulations of the restrictive Public Information Law since 1998. Even journalists were arrested. The period between 1998-2000 was a very difficult time to work in the media sector in Serbia and many characteristics (black-white portraying of events; fusion of news and comments; neglect of awkward facts; "disclosure" of the enemies, etc.)¹ are in resemblance to the communist past.

Communistic heritage in Serbian media

To the author of this paper it seemed that nonexistent consciousness of professional ethics is the most important relict of communism in the domain of media. Establishing a multiparty system automatically meant a greater freedom of speech and journalists had to adopt standards of objective journalism. However, for some of them this was a very difficult task. The reason for that lies in the fact that the majority of the journalists were educated in a country with a one-party system. Democratic institutions, free market, institutions and mechanisms for protection of human rights and political culture in general, did not exist. Nevertheless, this is not only because of the Serbian communist past. The modern Serbian state started its life in 1804, which is relatively late by comparison with other West European countries. This means that there has not been a tradition of the media autonomy in Serbia, which should be guaranteed by laws. Actually, since 1804, every political regime in Serbia strove to gain control over media.

Steps toward establishing an independent and professional media

The working group for media in Serbia at the South-East European Stability Pact has been evaluated in October 2004. Reforms in this domain have experienced seriously delay. According to the report this means that the democratization process has been even further imperiled and the absence of complete privatization of this sector still allows existence of a monopoly. The first step towards establishing an

independent and professional media will be led by privatization.¹ This question should be regarded as extremely important since in accordance to European principles, state ownership over the media does not exist anymore. The second step will be educating journalists, teaching them the standards and ethics of their profession. Many NGO's and professional associations are engaged with solving this problem.

Conclusion

Nowadays problems of media in Serbia are similar to those in other countries in transition, but Serbia started later with this process by comparison with other East European countries. There is no longer strong pressure on media and journalists and efforts for raising the quality of their work come from both sides, the state as well as the media. The need of accelerating reforms is essential right now.

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TERRORISM AS AN IDEOLOGY?

Introduction by Menno Donia and Bert van Steeg

Since 9/11 2001 Muslim fundamentalism has been considered as one of the greatest threats of the modern era. In 1993 the US-historian and political scientist Samuel Huntington wrote the article 'The Clash of Civilisation' in *Foreign Affairs*. In 1997 he published his 'The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order' which was a bestseller but got of a lot of criticism in the academic world. In this book Huntington's main thesis is that there is no longer a stable world order since the end of the Cold War in 1989. The world, in his view, is since then dominated by ethnic, cultural and religious conflict. Some cultures, in his opinion, have a historical violent relationship. Did 9/11 proof that his analysis was ultimately correct? Is terrorism the new and most important ideology of the 21st century?

First the group discussed the important question whether or not terrorist Muslim groups can be considered as organisations with clear political goals. Our conclusion was that is likely that a particular group consider themselves indeed as political actors with righteous causes, and not as a nihilistic organisation. But for the external observer their Islamic goals are diffuse and politically hard to interpreter. Bin Laden 's initial goal to get the American army out of the 'holy land' of Saudi-Arabia is a political goal combined with a strong religious conviction. But what to make of his Bin Laden's worldwide jihad against the West and his wish to establish a caliphate based on the Ottoman Empire? This is not a realistic political goal defined by a intellectual ideology but is a form of religious propaganda with the goal to create worldwide fear. The latter makes him indeed a terrorist. The next questions we discussed is whether or not Huntington in 1993 correctly foresaw the events happening on 9/11. It is not that difficult to criticise Huntington's thesis. First of all, he mentions many cultural barriers and conflicts. For instance a great deal of his book he spends time to elaborate about the conflict between the Western culture and the Chinese culture. Nowadays the

relations between these two regions are not as hostile and violent as Huntington predicted. But besides this, doesn't Huntington have a strong point with the clash of the Muslim civilisation and the western civilization? Answering this we have acknowledged the fact that the main problem is that Huntington makes a generalisation of complete cultures. The fact that Muhammed Atta is strong anti-western doesn't mean automatically that the complete Muslim population wants to take up arms against the West. His cultural analysis about a individual as Atta may be correct, but Huntington's 'hermetic' world-analysis is too far reached. That's mainly why historians criticised Huntington so strongly; historians namely try to analyse certain specific events and persons in a historical context. Huntington's way of culturally and violently interpreting the present and future was by some members of our group even characterized as a 'self- fulfilling prophecy'.

During the week there were different lectures of the ISHA-participants which tried to put terrorism in a historical context. Although Huntington was an interesting intellectual and almost philosophical starting point for us, we preferred the good-old way of historical analysis.

ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY AND TERRORISM AS STRATEGY

Kyösti Knuuttila (University of Helsinki, Finland)

Introduction

In this paper, I will examine radical Islamist groups and their goals. First of all, I shall concentrate on the ideology of Islamism and terrorism as a strategy for Islamist groups. Subsequently, I shall examine some points on polarizing world as it is represented by Samuel Huntington, but first I shall elaborate on the terminology I employ in this context.

My paper is based on the definition of ideology as used by Andrew Heywood in his book *"Political ideologies an introduction"*. In his view, ideology is a vision of how the present society is arranged and how it should be arranged in the future. Ideologies, therefore, explain how and why some changes should take place in societies. I shall apply this definition of ideology to extremist Islamist groups that accept violence as their strategy for change.

Islamism is an ideology that considers Islam as the ideological fundament of society. Islamism demands use of the Quran in organizing the society and applying Islamic sharia'a-law in societies. When applying Heywood's definition of ideology we should first consider how Islamist groups think of present society. In many Arabic countries Islamist groups consider secular governments to be corrupt and immoral. The same kinds of views are held in the West and especially of USA. Liberal western values (individualism, civil liberties, democracy etc.) are considered weak and corrupt. In a nutshell, the extremist Islamic groups believe that in many countries the dominant social situation is intolerable and should be changed.

Goals of extremist Islamic groups

In his article "*Al-Qaeda and nature of religious terrorism*" Mark Sedgwick argues that Islamist groups have two kinds of goals. They are certainly mixed and combined together, but distinguished here to be able to discuss them effectively. Islamists have both short-term political goals and long-term goals that are religiously defined.

Their long term goal is to build Islamic state(s) and unite all the Muslims of the world together (Ummah) that share same kind of religious views. Islamic states take Islam and Islamic law as the fundament of society. Short term goals of Islamist groups are politically defined. It is sufficient to see politics as a struggle for power to understand their political goals. Islamic groups try to get more power and it is possible to achieve this by recruiting new members and getting more support for radical views on religion. It can be argued that Islamist groups have instrumental attitude towards religion as they are using it to gain more power, but this can of course work both ways.

If we take Al-Qaeda for example: it tries to get more members, publicity and more support. These clearly are political goals, but the group is nevertheless decidedly Islamic in identity. It is Islamic because it considers its potential supporters to be all the Muslims of the world. It is beneficial for religious extremist groups that they do not have to categorize their supporters and they have already effective vocabulary that they don't have to invent. For example al-Qaeda uses Islamic vocabulary constantly: piety, martyrdom, duty, asceticism, holy war and so on.

Radical Ideology

Some Islamist groups think that changing a society peacefully is impossible or too inefficient. When applying Heywood's definition of ideology it seems that their ideology is to destroy the present system and build on the ruins an Islamic system. In his article "*Fighting the war of ideas*" Zeyno Baran presents ideology of extremist Islamic groups to be mixture of marxism-leninism with the idea of vanguard, fascistic rhetoric and Wahhabistic Islamic theology. Ideologies of extremist groups are popularized and simplified to achieve large groups of supporters. Islamist groups have left their ideological goals vaguely defined besides arguing to achieve Islamic states.

Islamist groups are trying to represent the world as a place where an eternal battle between good and bad is prevalent. In this kind of world you have to choose your side like George W. Bush said: "if you are not with us you're against us". Goals of the Muslim world are different than goals of the Western world and actually they are seen when they crash or collide. World is seen as a zero-sum game, where winners immediately bring forth the defeat of others.

Uncertainty of people is misused to get more members and supporters. In an uncertain and changing world they present fundamental answers for people. Radical groups use identity politics when they are saying that they fight for the good of all Muslims in the world. Identities are being built in relations to others. One's own identity is strengthened by pointing out differences to others and creating gaps between own and other identities. Political violence can be seen as an attempt to widen this gap between West and Islam. Identity politics plays an important role in this clash of civilizations and it seems that fundamentalists are stronger in building identities than western democracies.

Terrorism as strategy

As we have already noted some Islamist groups use terrorism as their strategy for achieving their goals. They see violence as justified form of fighting and it is given different kinds of religious and political motives. Mark Sedgwick takes in his article "*Al-Qaeda and nature of religious terrorism*" 11.9.2001 as an example to think motives behind terrorism and presents four different possible explanations. These different explanations do not have to be thought of as standing alone and we can think of them overlapping. Common for all these explanations is that extremist groups consider USA/West to be their main enemy.

It is possible that religiously motivated terrorists thought that they were fighting apocalyptic battle of the last days. Explaining violence as religiously motivated is not enough while terrorism is understood as a use of political violence. Using only religious explanations is not enough as Islamist groups consider religion and politics to be thoroughly mixed.

Sedgwick also argues that it might be possible that consequences of the attacks weren't thought very carefully beforehand and stresses here the urge to destroy. As the operation took many years to plan and execute it seems quite an unlikely explanation. Attackers might have thought that they would diminish US military interests in the Middle-East as a consequence of the attacks or they might even get US to retreat some troops. Still it is difficult to see that attackers thought that they were benefiting Muslims universally as a consequence of the attack.

Final point is to highlight the so called propaganda of the terrorist act. This means that the attackers tried to provoke USA to respond in a way that would accelerate the polarization between West and Muslim countries. With violent attacks against the US attackers tried to get that kind of reactions from the West that would stimulate moderate Muslims to take more radical views on Islam. By this kind of explanation the consequences are more important than the act itself. The "11/9" attacks can be seen as way to polarize relations between Islam and the West. That is because when more and more connections between West and Islam are cut Islamist extremists have more chance of turning people against the West and get more support for their radical religious views. When polarizing relations they are getting closer to their religious and political goals.

Views on the Clash of Civilizations

It can be argued that radical Islamic groups are successful in their goal if that goal is defined to be the polarization of international systems. By this definition of goals I draw on to our study groups' theme which was "Terrorism as an ideology" and Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations". Huntington criticizes a stable world order and puts effort into showing that after the end of Cold War, new lines of conflict appeared as well as new conflicts between civilizations.

Terrorism can be understood as a result of clash of civilizations, but it is used as a pejorative term to label the opponent. Usually, the use of word terrorism says more about its users than actual events. Acts of violence that are labelled as terrorism by one side have tendency to be seen by others as a justified means of freedom fight. Asymmetric fighting is supported by many Islamist groups that are not willing to resort to violence. Attempts to provoke opponents to take drastic actions that will widen the gap between two groups is a

strategy that has been used before in history. For example, 19th century anarchic movements used similar strategies to expose state oppression and launch wider anarchic movement by means of single acts of violence.

I'd like to note that if we accept Huntington's general views then extremist Islamist groups will inevitably achieve their goals. Huntington's definition of "clash of civilizations" is more than suitable for radical groups and it is exactly what they are looking for, as they are trying to polarize relations between Islam and the West. In a "Huntingtonian" world, fundamentalists are strong while secular and individualist values are weak. Islamism dramatizes Western weaknesses and stresses a moral basis and strong motivation for their actions. Identity politics will play a crucial role in the politics and Islamists are well equipped for the battle. With the popularized idea of a global Muslim community Islamists' identities are more and more based on religion instead of ethnicity and citizenship.

The crucial solution that will have the biggest impact on relations between Islam and Western states take place in Muslim societies. Islamists are trying to convert moderate Muslims to take more radical views on religion and this is happening in Muslim communities. The position of the moderate masses is one of the most important factors in the "clash of civilizations". Spreading democracy and western values is seen as one solution to terrorism. Building democracy is a complicated process and should be understood to be more than mere voting. Islamist groups are not willing to operate in a democratic environment. Pragmatism and compromises are not possible for extremist groups without them losing some essential parts of their ideology. Islamist state is authoritarian state where opposition has no space.

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EUROPE: NATIONALISM OF INTERNATIONALISM?

Introduction by Liz Oomens

The European Union is one of the greatest success stories in the history of international relations. In recent years the European Union has not only expanded her powers, but has also been able to increase the number of countries participating in the union to 25 states. The European Union (EU) exerts a strong attraction on neighboring countries and candidate member states. Does this mean the end of nationalism in Europe? But in addition to the EU, however, there is also the European experience and success of nationalism which some refer to as the most powerful ideology of the twentieth century. Nationalism in post-communist Europe has proved attractive to many countries. And the struggle between liberal and non-liberal values is still very much alive. There have been few political movements as powerful, changeable and sustained as nationalism. Nationalism in Europe would seem to be ubiquitous. Today, however, the issue is how democratic values can be reconciled with past legacies and current political processes. How can the success stories of nationalism and internationalism be reconciled? Internationalism and nationalism - are they exclusive?

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LAPUA MOVEMENT

Harri Mäkelä (University of Turku, Finland)

Introduction

The Lapua Movement, which may not be very well known in countries other than Finland, played a great role in post civil-war Finland. Although it was active only between the years 1929 and 1932 it has been the most influential extreme-right movement in Finland. The movement, although by some thought of as a party, certainly did not always follow the law when it wanted to be heard and has also because of that been a controversial part of Finnish history.

This paper will try to explain to the reader why the movement became so popular and why it collapsed after being active for such a short while. Because right-wing radicalism in its different forms was quite popular in almost all of Europe at this time, most surveys of the movement have been done by Finnish historians, and the material is generally in Finnish or Swedish. The author has taken the freedom to translate some of the material, and is responsible for all the translations.

The rise of the movement

After Finland received its independence in late 1917 a civil-war broke out, putting the Whites (bourgeois) side against the Reds (socialists). The war, though did not last very long, was extremely cruel, leaving deep scars in the minds of people on both sides, especially on the Reds' side had been defeated. Although the Reds lost the war, their parties were not forbidden by the liberal parties that formed the government, and they continued to be popular. In fact, studies have shown that right after the war, the Social Democratic Party had more power in the parliament than the right-wing. This, and other major setbacks, e.g. choosing a president instead of a king, led to the rise of right-wing extremism, and in fact a right-winged revolution was quite close to happening during the 1920's.

Also, left-wing radicalism grew at the same time, mostly because of the success of the Bolshevik Revolution in the Soviet Union, and because many workers were dissatisfied with the Social Democratic Party which, they thought, were being too liberal. In the year 1926, the Social Democratic Party formed its first (minority) Government, which made the two extreme sides even more radical, the right because a left party was able to form the government, and the left because they did not think the Social Democratic Party was socialistic enough¹.

After 1926 the radical left started to expand their actions even more, among other actions they started many strikes – the longest lasting 10 months – and they held several demonstrations. The situation became even worse when the Social Democratic Party in 1928 agreed to limit the Communists right to work. Now the Communists applied with even more drastic methods, for example, arranging a general strike, but all the actions failed. In fact, the Communist actions probably helped right extremism to grow, and during this time many anti-socialist organizations were founded.

One of these organizations was the Lapua Movement, which started in the small city of Lapua in November 1929 by furious anti-socialists who stopped a Communist meeting. The first of December 1929 over one thousand people held an anti-Communist meeting in Lapua where they demanded a ban of all Communist activities. After this several other meetings were held throughout the country and the movement grew stronger.

The main reason for the movement starting in the small town of Lapua was probably chance, but Ostrobothnia had, since the civil-war, been a strong outpost for the White side, and the hatred towards the Red side still continued to live strong. Also the leader of the Lapua Movement, Vihtori Kosola, who was know for holding powerfull speeches, was from Ostrobothnia.

The movement in its full strength

After the founding meeting in Lapua, the movement sent a delegation to the parliament in Helsinki to make their voice heard. During their stay in Helsinki the movement made it clear to the parliament that if the parliament “did not deal adequately against the Communists, the people in the countryside would have to do it themselves”. After this the parliament changed the law in a way that it made possible to

forbid unwanted organizations from meeting and to make it impossible for forbidden organizations to continue their activities as the same organization under a different name. However, the parliament did not accept the movement's wish of a sharpening of the freedom of press.

After this the movement, which thought that it now had to take the law in their own hands, destroyed a newspaper-machine in Vaasa, because they thought that the machine was used to print a Communist newspaper. When the police started to look for the guilty ones, 72 supporters of the movement announced their guilt. When the trial began, supporters of the movement forced a member of the newspaper publishers, Asser Salo, to Lapua against his will. This was the first of the so called transportations which was one of the movement's trade marks. Later the movement started to transport people, whom they - for some reason - did not like, to the Soviet border. This was done because the movement in this way wanted to show their enemies that they should move to a Communist country if they preferred socialism. Altogether the movement transported over 200 people, but most of them were only transported to the neighboring city and beaten there, just so that they would realize the strength of the movement. Members of the movement also killed enemies, but these deeds were never sanctioned by the movement's leaders. These acts of terror that were not properly punished by the parliament and made Finland look bad in the rest of Europe.¹

Another action the movement became famous for was the great "Peasant-March" the 7th of July 1930, in which 12 000 members of the movement marched to Helsinki and demanded new, stricter, laws against the Communists. After that, the President dissolved the parliament and announced a new election, in which, after pressure from the movement, parties favoring the Communist laws won. After this, laws forbidding all Communist actions were approved, and the movement could stop planning a coup d'état, which they had planned in case the laws would not have been accepted.

The fall of the movement

After the Communist laws had been approved in October 1930 the movement had reached an important goal, but the leaders were still not happy, and now actions were begun also against Social Democrats. This was not popular among the more moderate members

of the movement, and separation from the group became common, especially amongst members from the Agrarian Party.

Also other differences of opinion inside the movement became clear, and the leaders started to have difficulties in holding the movement united. This became clear when some members of the group transported the former President, K.J. Ståhlberg, and his wife to Joensuu, just a couple of weeks after the Communist laws had been approved and the leaders of the movement announced that all transportations should be ceased.

In March 1931, almost a year after the Peasant-March, P.E. Svinhufvud, a member of the right-wing National Coalition Party, became President. This calmed the movement down for a while, because the movement thought that Svinhufvud had the same goals as them. That thought proved wrong, and led to a radicalization of the movement, which now wanted to ban even the Social Democratic Party, and a coup d'état once again did not seem impossible. In February 1932, 300- 400 armed members from the most radical part of the movement surrounded the City Hall in Ohkola, Mäntsälä, where the Social Democrat Member of Parliament, Mikko Erich, was holding a speech. Erich was hated by members of the movement because he had earlier represented the National Coalition Party and was therefore seen as a traitor.

When Erich did not stop his speech the movement opened fire and managed to stop the meeting. After this, members of the movement from all of Finland started to gather in Mäntsälä. On February 29th 1932 leaders of the movement gave an order to their supporters in the whole country to mobilize, but this order was followed by only 5000-6000 men. At this stage the government reacted fast, and ordered the movements leaders to be arrested, and on March 2nd 1932 President Svinhufvud encouraged, through a radio-speech, the rebels to go home. He also promised that the rebels would not be punished if they surrendered. After the leader of the troops, Lauri Malmberg, signed an appeal for surrender, the rebels dropped their weapons and the movement's story came to an end¹.

Conclusion

Although there are several other reasons leading to the rise of the Lapua Movement, those mentioned here are the most important. Other reasons not mentioned in the text are the financial crisis in the

end of the 1920's and some members dislike of the general right to vote. The rush of the success in the beginning and the common fear of communists were the main reasons for the movement's rapid expansion. People who normally would not have been politically radical found courage when they realized the success the movement had in the beginning. In this way one could say that the movement's rise resembled the rise of other fascist movements at the same time. The movement found its support from lower classes of people in the beginning, and later on higher classes started to support the movement, also this resembling other fascist movements at the same time. Also the strong leaders resemble the ones other fascist movements had, with Vihtori Kosola being an important front-figure. Not always following Democratic methods was also common among fascist movements at the time the movement was active.

The fall of the movement mostly had to do with the difficulties of keeping the movement united. The most radical members of the movement committed several deeds that were condemned by the leaders of the movement, and in the people's eyes that made the movement look bad. Also the movement did not have clear goals, and, for example, trying to ban the Social Democrats was very controversial even inside the movement. The attempted coup d'état in Mäntsälä in 1932 showed clearly how desperate the movement had become and that it no longer was a real threat.

However, the movement was the most radical political group in independent Finland thus far, and for example, the group has done the last political murders in Finland to this date. Even though the coup d'état did not work out, the movement clearly showed that maybe not fascism, but at least ultra-nationalism, could be a strong force even in Finland.

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SWITZERLAND BETWEEN INTERNALISATION AND NATIONAL ISOLATION

Ursula Kleinöder (University of Berlin, Switzerland)

Introduction

Switzerland is developing, its image as an important player in international organisations. On the other hand, Switzerland is getting more and more isolated from the rest of Europe, because the system of direct democracy prevents the country from becoming a member of the European Union. Which rhetorical arguments are used to create and preserve a positive Swiss image?

To answer this question I shall start with a short theoretical introduction about national image and national branding in Switzerland. In an attempt to demonstrate the changing discussion about Switzerland's relation to international institutions and Europe, I will compare the statements at the international exhibitions between 1958 and 2005. To reflect on the present situation, I have interviewed Johannes Matyassy, CEO of the National Image Institution "Presence Switzerland". We spoke about the themes that were important to Swiss politics in the year 2005 and about matters that should not be made known abroad for not damaging the Swiss Image.

National Image and National Branding in Switzerland

Foreign countries create images in our minds which in many cases can be attributed to personal experiences that do not always correspond to reality. In general, it can be said that, the less we know about a country, the more simplistic our image of a country will be.

In today's global society countries are competing for the world's attention, tourists, foreign investment and capital. The destination people choose to spend their holidays, the places where companies do investments, in which cities major conferences are held – all these decisions affect the prosperity of a country. That's why countries are trying to create a positive image. Nation branding is a

process in which a country tries to influence its image for a particular purpose. Switzerland intends to ensure that its image is not dominated by events from the past, but corresponds with current reality and is oriented towards the future. Nation branding is successful when a country has a clear identity that is being heard in this age of information overkill.

Switzerland is in the lucky position of not being unknown. Thanks to strong but positive clichés, such as its beautiful landscape, watches and chocolate, as well as its reputation for valuing high quality and reliability, it already has a well defined profile. The associations people make with our country have taken decades to form and are undergoing a constant process of development. Ever since in 1851 the first international exhibition took place in London, Switzerland has participated regularly. In the nineteenth century the most important reason to participate in the exhibition was to present its state of art and industry to a large international public. Nowadays countries have to compete in cultural, artistic, touristic and political themes as well to change or strengthen their images.

Since 1990 Swiss banks were criticized and the role of Switzerland in the Second World War was discussed for years all over Europe and the United States. In the end Swiss politicians worried about the good reputation of Switzerland being seriously damaged. Financial laws were changed in order to stop organised criminality and "Presence Switzerland" was founded to find out how the country's image was changing. Its aim was to develop good relations with opinion leaders in other countries. "Presence Switzerland" presents balanced information and positive impressions of the country. It is also responsible for organizing the Swiss participation at the international exhibitions.

Switzerland, a cosmopolitan state in the heart of Europe

Switzerland seems to be an island on the maps of many European Institutions. This self-made isolation is a consequence of its political system of direct democracy, which does not allow the government to sign any international agreements without agreement of the majority of the Swiss citizens.

At the International exhibition in Brussels 1958, Switzerland was asked to participate in an exposition of the Council of Europe about the history of free democratic political institutions. A few other

state departments were asked to participate as well. It seemed clear to everyone that the swearing ceremony, which took place 1291 on the Rütli and the Swiss "Landsgemeinden" ¹ would be important themes to be treated in such an international exhibition. On the other hand, nobody wanted to be responsible for the Swiss contribution to the exhibition, organized by an institution that Switzerland did not belong to. Finally Switzerland did not participate because of "financial reasons". In their own Pavilion however, a room was installed, which was called "in the heart of Europe" and presented the natural beauty of Switzerland. In another room photographs of everyday life were meant to show how small and different Switzerland was compared to other European countries.

Another popular way to show the Swiss connections to its neighbouring states, are putting up maps with big railway lines, rivers and exportations, which are crossing the borders. Also the pavilion's construction is meant to show the Swiss openness. The idea was to avoid long waiting lines and to give the visitor the possibility to visit the pavilion in his own speed, regarding his own interest (in a so called "free flow exhibition"). This should make visitors think of Switzerland as an open-hearted and welcoming country. The Swiss Pavilion that was created by Peter Zumthor in 2000 in Hannover with its 52 entrances and citations in many different languages was designed to enforce this impression.

In 2005, cooperation with its neighbouring states was very important to Switzerland. The Schengen-Dublin treaty, the Cross over boarder employment enlargement and the Asylum- and Foreigner laws were some of the most discussed themes in Swiss politics. It was, and is still, very important to place special emphasis on the cosmopolitan attitude and Switzerland's geographical position in the "heart of Europe".

Armed Neutrality and Solidarity

Another important term for Switzerland's relationship to other countries is "neutrality". In the late 50's, national defence and neutrality guaranteed by a strong army was claimed to be one of the most important tasks of the federal state.

In 1963 Switzerland participated at the universal exhibition in Canada. In the pavilion and the official speech of Bundesrat Spühler great efforts were made to guarantee the politics of strict neutrality.

Neutrality was claimed to be necessary to maintain Switzerland's unity. The term and its political consequences are nowadays criticized by foreigners, but even more by Swiss intellectuals. This makes it difficult to present abroad and therefore international solidarity is often used to justify the Swiss neutrality. President Spühler accentuated in 1967 that Switzerland was member of nearly all special organisations of the UNO, except the political ones. He talked about strong efforts made on humanitarian projects and aid for developing countries.

An interesting solution to treat this difficult topic was found for the Swiss Pavilion at the universal exhibition in Hanover in 2000. A quotation from a Swiss writer was published in Swiss dialect (which is incomprehensible for everyone except the German speaking Swiss visitors!): "luege | aaluege | nöd rede | sicher sii | nu luege | nüd znäch | nu vu wiitem | ruhig bliibe | schwiizer si | schwiizer bliibe | nu luege". The short poem criticises, that Swiss neutrality is more and more an ideological pretext for doing nothing at all.

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IDEOLOGIES IN ANCIENT TIMES, MIDDLE AGES AND EARLY MODERN TIMES

Introduction by Jonneke Pans and Erik van Lakerveld

This work group faced a difficult task. As the general theme of the ISHA conference was 'Ideologies', our study group studied Ideology before modern times. This made the group the underdog in the conference, because ideologies are generally believed to be modern. So before us our study group found an interesting few days discussing a wide variety of subjects on the matter.

The period we were supposed to study posed another difficulty on the participants, as we were talking about an almost infinite history, just back in time from 1800 to the beginning of human kind. Of course nothing could be said of ideology before ancient Greece, or Rome, so the period covered by the study group stretched roughly from 100 B.C. to 1800 A.D. This proved to be interesting, but problematic at the same time; the period was so broad that no one possessed great knowledge of the ideologies that were brought to the fore, and not of the period they were developed either.

However, the study group proved to be just as entertaining and interesting as it was diverse. Students from Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Serbia enthusiastically debated about topics such as 'Witch Hunt as a medieval ideology' and 'City planning under absolutism'. We remember the sessions as very pleasant and we have learned a lot. It was difficult, and this summary of the meetings proves it once again, to come to one general outcome of the study group, because of the elements mentioned above. There was, nonetheless, a basic presumption that our group came to form and that was that ideologies did exist before modern times. However, these ideologies were, because of obvious technical reasons, less widespread. In Ancient times, the Middle-Ages and the Early-Modern period it was almost impossible to create a widely known and

followed ideology, the only 'ideology', if you like, that did that job was Christianity.

Christianity brings us to another point, as in pre-modern times Christianity was everywhere and all the ideologies were based on Christian values and belief. There was not yet such a strong division between worldly and spiritual powers, as they were considered intertwined. This shows how problematic it was to point towards specific political ideologies in pre-modern times, for they were always religious as well. It also shows that they indeed did exist, the ideologies of before 1800, but in a Christian disguise.

To conclude this short findings of the study group, we would like to stress that working together with this variety of students from all over Europe was a great joy for us. We would like to thank the organization of ISHA Utrecht for the wonderful conference and all the participants who made it such a live lasting experience.

GREAT EXPECTATIONS, THE IDEOLOGY OF SPARTAN MOTHERHOOD

Henrieke Korten (University of Nijmegen, Netherlands)

Introduction

Sparta as a *polis* has always had a reputation of militant and heroic greatness. This reputation was not restricted only to the men; the women also were seen as extraordinary. This soldierly *polis* did not give full citizenship to just everyone, it was rewarded to a very select and elite group. Among the population of Sparta, there was a large knot of the so called *helotoi*. They were forced to manage the *kleroi*, the different estates in which newly conquered land was divided.⁶¹ The number of Spartiats, men with full citizenship, was small in comparison to the whole community especially in the 5th century BC. And out of fear for destabilization of the strict social order, they were subjected to an extremely harsh discipline. This can be said for the men as well as for the women of the aristocratic class, which is why they are a suitable subject for a paper about ideology. In this paper I will try to throw light on this ideology. What did the *polis* want from the female Spartiates?

In order to answer this question, certain aspects of life of the female Spartan must be discussed. Next to the attitudes and actions that were demanded of her by the society, it must be clear what her position and her role was inside the household, *oikos*. For this information I will use mainly Plutarch and Xenophon. While deducing information out of these texts, it must be taken into account that these narratives are not peculiarly reliable. Xenophon lived during the 5th and 4th century, which makes him a contemporary writer of the subject. He lived in Athens but admired the Spartan *polis* highly.⁶² In 394 he actually followed Agesilaos, who was then the king of Sparta,

⁶¹ H. Cancik and H. Schneider (ed.), *Der Neue Pauly: Enzyklopädie der Antike. Altertum*. Band 11 (Stuttgart and Weimar 2001) 790.

⁶² P. Kroh, *Lexikon der Antiken Autoren* (Stuttgart 1972) 664-665.

and fought as an Athenian on the Spartan side against Athens during the Battle of Koroneia. For that he was of course banned from Athens. In Sparta he was then received and even given some land. It remains unclear if he has ever been in Athens afterwards. Because of his relation to the Spartans, his texts must be looked at cautiously.

Plutarch was born shortly after 50 AD in Chaironeia, but studied in Athens, where he made standing as a philosopher and biographer.⁶³ His aim in writing was not to construct a historical story as Ranke had wanted it, but to make a picture of the lives of the people. Historical facts were used as examples for certain aspects of his anecdotes, but were not always his point of departure. While reading his texts one must bear in mind, that he was Athenian and thus likely to be hostile towards the people that was seen as militarily threatening and culturally astounding.

Being a wife and mother in Sparta

There was a very big difference in the age when married between Spartan girls and for example Athenian girls. Spartan girls were around eighteen, Athenian girls around thirteen.⁶⁴ As a result husband and wife in Sparta did not have many years between them. The reason why Spartan girls weren't married until this age was that they were supposed to be physically fully grown. This meant that they had to have had their first period a while ago and had to be fully developed. Only then were they totally fit to bear strong children and to be married. The small age difference between husband and wife in Sparta⁶⁵ contributed to a more emotionally equal relationship in comparison to that of an Athenian couple, where the husband could be as old as 60 and the wife as young as 10.⁶⁶

In Sparta females were highly motivated to bear good and healthy children, especially sons. This doesn't distinct Sparta from other Greek *poleis*. When a woman delivers a strong and decent citizen, she deserves credit for that. A difference between Athenian and Spartan women is the content of their domestic tasks. Athenian women have a lot of time-consuming tasks; next to the organization of

⁶³ Kroh, *Lexikon*, 502.

⁶⁴ S.B. Pomeroy, *Spartan Women* (Oxford 2002) 44.

⁶⁵ A man married when he was about 32, this was when he wasn't required to live in the barracks with the other Spartan men anymore.

⁶⁶ S. Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece* (London 1995) 124.

the tasks of her personnel and the managing of the victuals, she also must take a seat behind the loom. The fabrics she hereby produces are her source of income and pride. This was not the case for Spartiates. They were supposed to have the same weaving and organizational skills, but they weren't required to actually pursue those at all.⁶⁷ They had their domestic slaves to do all the work in and around the house.

The rest of the Greeks expect their girls to imitate the sedentary life that is typical of handicraftsmen – to keep quiet and do wool work. How then is it to be expected that women so brought up will bear fine children? But Lycurgus thought the labor of slave women sufficient to supply clothing. He believed motherhood to be the most important function of freeborn women. Therefore in the first place he insisted on physical training for the female, no less than for the male sex: moreover he instituted races and trials of strength for women competitors as for men, believing that if both parents are strong they produce more vigorous offspring.

There was no prestige or pride to be had from a nice woven cloth or a perfectly grown cabbage. Xenophon, The Lacedaemonians, I. 3-4.

When a woman from Ionia showed vast pride in a bit of her own weaving, which was very valuable, a Spartan woman pointed to her four sons, who were most well-behaved, and said, 'Such should be the employments of the good and honourable woman, and it is over these that she should be elated and boastful.' Plutarch, Sayings of Spartan Women, 241.9.

Spartan women had their very own source of income. Other than Athenian women, they had the right to own and manage money and estates. They had a dowry, an advance of their inheritance and/or the yields of their *kleros*. Her *oikos* was not so much used as a unit of output as in other *poleis*.

The tasks as a mother were not very different. Mothers all over the Greek lands were supposed to keep their offspring alive and make good mothers of their daughters and good citizens of their sons, for the time they lived in their houses.⁶⁸ Spartan mothers had more time

⁶⁷ Pomeroy, *Spartan Women*, 51.

⁶⁸ P. Cartledge, 'Spartan Wives: Liberation or License?' in: *The Classical Quarterly*, New Series 31 (1981) 93.

off, which they could spend on music, poems and dance. Their husbands were away from home the most of the time, what left them free to lead an active life without the constraints that were posed on Athenian women.

Secret extramarital relationships are not known to have been punished by law like in Athens. It was certainly not approved of, neither was it such an outrageous act as in other *poleis*.

A girl had secret relations with a man and after bringing on an abortion, she bore up bravely, not uttering a single sound, that her delivery took place without the knowledge of her father and others who were near. For the confronting of her indecorum with decorum she gained the victory over the poignant distress of her pains. Plutarch, Sayings of Spartan Women, 242.26.

Adultery was seen as a threat for the pure and highly rated citizenship. When a Spartan woman had an affair with a Spartan, she could try to get her husband's permission for a second marriage. Polyandry was a way to exploit proven qualities in motherhood fully: the permission offered women to run two households, which was seen as a prove of extreme competence, as long as the husbands all had full citizenship.⁶⁹ In other *poleis* there was no such thing as polyandry.

In Athenian houses there were women's quarters separate from the rooms where the men and guests stayed. This put considerable restrictions on the freedom of movement for women. Spartan houses were not divided into women's and men's quarters. The men had actually little to do in the house, weren't much around anyway, and had not much interest in what happened inside. They had to occupy themselves with militant business, not with the household.⁷⁰ As a result Spartan women could move around freely.

Spartan women in public

Just like every Greek women did Spartiates have a special value for their *polis*, because they were the ones that gave birth to new citizens and soldiers. What made a Spartan woman different from the Cretan, Gortynan and Athenian members of her sex is her role in the household. The household was not seen as a representation of the

⁶⁹ Pomeroy, *Spartan Women*, 75.

⁷⁰ Blundell, *Women in Ancient Greece*, 155.

polis and it was just not that important. Women's and men's loyalty was to be with the *polis*, not with the family. Husbands first of all should make good fighters for Sparta, women first of all should bear strong sons. They were responsible to raise their children as patriots.⁷¹ Love of her country should be her greatest motivation in this.

Another Spartan woman made away with her son, who had deserted his post, on the ground that he was unworthy of his country, saying: 'Not mine, this scion.' This is the epigram referring to her:

Off to your fate through the darkness, vile scion, who makes such a hatred.

So the Euraotas flow not e'en for the timorous deer.

Worthless whelp that you are, vile remnant, be off now to Hades;

Off! For I never bore Sparta's unworthy son.'

Another hearing that her son had fallen on the field of battle, said:

'Let the poor cowards be mourned, but, with never a tear do I bury you, my son, who are mine, yea, and are Sparta's as well.

Plutarch, *Sayings of Spartan Women*, 241.1-2.

They spent most of their time outdoors and the *polis* even prescribed her to exercise regularly in order to be able to produce strong and healthy children. They had more time off and less supervision. It was for Sparta not necessary that they stayed at home and had only limited contact with other people. It was for Sparta necessary that they were healthy and had the right attitude in raising her children. This part of the woman's task was stressed.

Conclusion

The ideology of Spartan motherhood was designed by the *polis* in order to have a supply of soldiers with the right mentality. They were supposed to risk their lives without hesitation during one of the wars, which the Spartans waged in abundance. The soldiers were to have had an upbringing in which they were to be taught to value life lowly and the Spartan collectivity highly. As in all the other Greek *poleis*, mothers were believed to play the key role in the upbringing of

⁷¹ Cartledge, 'Spartan Wives', 100.

children. As boys lived with their mothers quite some time⁷², the society required them to give an immaculate and high standing education. The behavior of a man, especially in battle, reflected on his mother particularly. She earned respect by rearing strong and militant sons and should trouble herself without limits to achieve this.

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⁷² This is until they are around seven, then they go to the barracks. But they remain to have close contact with their mothers, in contrast with for example Athenian boys. They were to have contact with males only from early childhood on. As a result, their mother did not play a great role in their lives.

NOBLE AND URBAN FAMILY-STRUCTURES IN THE HUNGARIAN KINGDOM IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

Robert Balogh (University of Debrecen, Hungary)

Introduction

The concept of nobility is a key for understanding Medieval societies and so is that of the town; the medieval commune. In the last three decades a number of studies has been carried out to examine the medieval noble society of the Hungarian Kingdom (I prefer this term to “Hungarian nobility” for greater clarity: even though nobles constituted the political nation of Hungary, ethnically many of them were not Hungarian) and well-trained scholars have taken on the task of penetrating the urban society of the same entity as far as possible. However, very few attempts have been made to describe and compare these two structures on a micro-level, on the level of families.

The structure of noble families: the clan

The family of a noble was not family in the modern sense of the word; it should sooner be described as a clan. The clan was the unity of those who had the same ancestors, but regarding property this only included the male descendants. If we look for the binding that for many generations held the micro spheres of noble society together as strongly as fiefs did in Western-Europe, we find the clan.

The basic element of the birth of a clan was a kind of individualisation: breaking away from the genus through partition of the lands owned by the living male members. Until 1343 the partition was done drastically: whole villages and regions became the property of one or the other branch of the genus. In 1343 a royal decree ordered that the partition must point to a division of each unit. This was probably the request of many branches: thanks to the geographical proximity, it became much easier to claim the rights of the lands of other disappearing branches.

The everyday life of the clan people was filled with disputes over small plots, since it was the main duty of each generation to preserve and enlarge the lands of the clan. It was also the basic interest of the members of the clans to secure the survival of the clan by marriages that were fertile in every sense. It was a sign of the strength of the clan that the members had to consult before taking decisions in questions of marriage, inheritance. A further telling legal institution was that the members of the clan had to maintain even those who denied their family. It was virtually impossible to get out of the clan.

At the same time we have to remember that nobles who lived around the court could receive land from the king that was their own and was not integrated to the clan-holdings. Another – rarely practiced – possibility was the creation of a new family by declaring a female to be a legal heir. The descendants of the female were nobles and inherited lands while lands of the clan had normally become royal properties if there was no male heir left. This opportunity, however, was practically only open to the most influential individuals in the court.

Families in the city

In order to outline the structure of urban families I mainly used the Law Book of Buda. This is a simplification since a number of diploma and statutes survived from other cities too. Simplification is required not only because the latter sources are not easily accessible, but also because of the fact that Buda was the largest and in many respect the most important city of late medieval Hungary. Therefore it can be seen as a standard example. A characteristic article of the Law Book is no. 397.

“A woman disposes of all her wealth that she had received from her parents or husband. She can do everything she wishes even against the will of her husband unless she promises a part of it to her husband as dos or in other form”

The point of view of this article is drastically different from that of a clan of nobles. The wife is free to sell her property and relatives outside the nucleus of the family are not even mentioned. From the point of view of a noble it is also hard to imagine that a women

promises *dos* and not the other way around. The legal capacity of the wife was incomparably greater than that of their noble counterparts. The reason of this increased prestige can be found in the different function of marriage in the urban family. The crucial point was that both the Law book of Buda and the *ius tavernicale* ordered that

"The wealth and property of those people who die without testimony, but have children and wife shall be divided into equal parts and distributed equally among the widow and the children."

As a consequence of this principal marriage became an important channel for the circulation of wealth and resources and had special significance for all urban communities (guilds, brotherhoods etc.)

However, article no. 313 also contains some points that carry the traces of noble-like thinking. In case there was division of wealth in the marriage, the part of the husband can only be passed on through his brothers and sisters, while his wife and children cannot inherit it from him. Studies of the practices showed clearly that the provisions were not regularly applied, for it would have involved the danger of wealth slipping out of the city. It was in the interest of the city authorities and of the husband to find excuses: he would often leave everything to his children and wife undivided in testaments.

Regarding the structure of urban families, I want to reflect on one more circumstance: the size of families. Obviously, we cannot find direct proof for the supposed average family-size of 3,4-4. At the same time it is instructive that in the spectrum of the articles of the Law book we mainly find references to relationships of wife-husband-children.

The most exciting characteristic of medieval Hungarian cities is not the small size of families, but the fact that so many families died out after the second generation (i.e. there were few grandchildren.) This cannot simply be explained by the high mortality of children, but mainly were the consequences of late marriages. It was expected that a certain wealth should be accumulated on both sides before marriage was performed and not much time was left for giving birth. Widowers in their turn usually married young women, but these second marriages were very often fruitless. Cities could only survive thanks to large-scale immigration.

"If a stranger wishes to move to Buda and gain citizenship, it must be an

honest and wealthy man. If he does not have immovables, he must find men who guarantee that he will pay taxes in that and all other years and that he will stay with the city in good and bad luck, equally.” (Article no.66.)

The most important condition of becoming a citizen was wealth. On first impressions, this does not make large-scale immigration possible; it rather inhibits it. However, the article does not talk of those who moved into the city but have never gained citizenship. Beyond silence there must have been wisdom: the councillors of the city must have been aware of the changes in population. There was need of people, but the need was only limited for economically powerful and politically active citizens.

In short the main differences between the family structure of noble clans and that of urban communities were the following: the possibility of inheritance on the female line preferred nuclear family to clan; wives had significant legal capacity probably as a consequence of their greater role in the accumulation of wealth. Moreover, the number of children was significantly smaller, while the number of widows decreased significantly. The principal reason of such differences is arguably the fact that to city dwellers wealth was not primarily land. Mobile goods are easier to be associated with or linked to persons or to a smaller, nuclear family than landed property. Thus, owners felt that the natural heirs of their inheritance were their children and wife and not the male-members of their larger family.

Another important factor was that the main authority in the city was the city council. To a council as a legislative body it was much more important to preserve the tax-base of city dwellers than to secure that wealth accumulated to the hands of certain families. At the same time, on a noble land the only real authority was the noble clan. The citizen did not live isolated: the primary public space for him was the commune where he lived and not his clan.

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IMPORTANT FIGURES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEOLOGY

Introduction by Jan Hartman and Abel Gilsing

The ISHA conference was an amazing experience. I was happy to see that history students from all around the world not only share a common interest (history), but also speak a common language. David Lowenthal wrote 'the past is a foreign country', and stretching this analogy would mean that the past of a foreign country would be very very foreign to us. However, the different pasts of different countries other from our own seem to be quite familiar in themes and topics. Thus learning about the history of other people is learning more about our own past and the way we - as historians - write it.

Furthermore, ISHA is more than just an exchange of historical narratives or ideas. It is also one of those projects that enables (professional?) friendships to cross borders. It is a way to bring together regions that seem remote from our perspective, but are remarkably close when engaged with. ISHA provides a forum for the like-minded to laugh, talk history, and have a drink in the evening. I was glad to take part in this by facilitating discussion sessions on the complex concept of ideology and important figures in ideology.

Marx and Hitler and maybe Luther, McCarthy, Margaret Thatcher, Robespierre and Lech Walesa (*Solidarno*) can be seen as advocates of an ideology. However, it might not have been their intention to reconstruct society in accordance with their ideological beliefs. Luther probably did not envisage the Reformation when he nailed his proclamation on the church door and maybe McCarthy never dreamed that his ideas would become known under the term 'McCarthyism'. The question remains: To which historic figure can we ascribe an ideology and what was the content of this ideology? And how did these "ideologues" envisage their ideas would be implemented in reality?

FRIEDRICH ENGELS

Petri Toiviainen (University of Turku, Finland)

Introduction

Friedrich Engels (November 28, 1820–August 5, 1895) was a 19th-century German political philosopher. With his partner, the better known Karl Marx, Engels developed communist theory, co-authoring *The Communist Manifesto* (1848). Engels also edited several volumes of *Das Kapital* after Marx's death.

Biography

Engels was born in Barmen-Elberfeld (now Wuppertal), the eldest son of a successful German textile industrialist. As a young man, his father sent him to England to help manage his cotton factory in Manchester. Shocked by the widespread poverty, he began to write an account which was published in 1845 as *The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844*.

In the same year, Engels began contributing to a journal called the *Franco-German Annals*, which was edited and published by Karl Marx in Paris. After their first meeting in person, they discovered that they both shared the same views on capitalism, and decided to work more closely together. After Marx was deported from France in January 1845, they decided to move to Belgium, which permitted greater freedom of expression than other countries in Europe.

In July 1845, Engels took Marx to England. There he met an Irish working-class woman named Mary Burns, with whom he lived until her death. Later, he lived with her sister, Lizzie. These women may have introduced him to the Chartist movement, of whose leaders he met several, including George Harney. Engels and Marx returned to Brussels in January 1846, where they set up the Communist Correspondence Committee. The plan was to unite socialist leaders living in different parts of Europe. Influenced by Marx's ideas, socialists in England held a conference in London where they formed a new organization called the Communist League.

Engels attended as a delegate and had a great impact on the developed strategy of action.

In 1847, Engels and Marx began writing a pamphlet together. It was based on Engels' *The Principles of Communism*. The 12,000-word pamphlet was finished in six weeks, written in such a manner as to make communism understandable to a wide audience. It was named *The Communist Manifesto* and was published in February 1848. In March, both Engels and Marx were expelled from Belgium. They moved to Cologne, where they began to publish a radical newspaper, the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*. Engels was an active participant in the Revolution of 1848, taking part in the uprising at Elberfeld. Engels fought in the Baden campaign against the Prussians (June/July 1849) as the aide-de-camp of August Willich, who was leader of a Free Corps in the Baden-Palatinate uprising.

By 1849, both Engels and Marx were forced to leave the country and moved to London. The Prussian authorities applied pressure on the British government to expel the two men, but Prime Minister Lord John Russell refused. With only the money that Engels could raise, the Marx family lived in extreme poverty. In order to help supply Marx with an income, Engels returned to work for his father in Manchester, before moving to London in 1870. After Marx's death in 1883, Engels devoted much of the rest of his life to editing and translating Marx's writings. However, he also contributed significantly to feminist theory, seeing for instance the concept of monogamous marriage as having arisen because of the domination of man over women. In this sense, he ties communist theory to the family, arguing that women have been dominated by men just as workers have been by the capitalist class. Engels died in London in 1895, childless.

Works

Cola di Rienzi 1840?/1974

Letters from Wuppertal

The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844

Anti-Dühring

Dialectics of Nature

Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy

Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State

Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany

The German Ideology (with Marx)

The Holy Family (with Marx)
The Peasant War in Germany

Synopsis of the Communist Manifesto

The Communist Manifesto is too long to be a concise declaration of principles and too short to be a book. It is comprised of about 17,000 words including various introductions by Friedrich Engels. It is basically arranged in four sections. The first section introduces the Marxian idea of history as a class struggle. It juxtaposes the conditions and development of various strata of society, "freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf...in a word, oppressor and oppressed." It hypothesizes how the development of each of these in history gave rise to the next step in an inevitable historical process culminating ultimately in the rise of one working class.

Marx and Engels put forward the notion that the working class is exploited by the bourgeoisie. Positing a labour theory of value where the value of goods and services is based strictly on the amount of labour that is put into them, The Manifesto, says that all the surplus that goes to the capitalist as profits is in reality the "property" of the working class who created that wealth.

The second section of the Communist Manifesto addresses the nature of the new working class which he calls the proletariat. He reviews its implications for the advancement of society, including the abolition of property and family. This section also stresses a kind of Utopia that can only be brought about by violence and conflict with the working class wresting power from the bourgeoisie (the owners of the means of production). This conflict is projected also to bring about the end of nation-states and, ultimately, all forms of government, resulting in a worker's paradise.

Parts 3 and 4 of the Communist Manifesto are more arcane and relate more with the politics of the age and geographic region in which the document was written (1848). Section 3 discusses the various forms of socialism, feudal socialism, petty-bourgeois socialism, and "true" socialism. Part 4 goes on to show how these various groups inter-relate. The document ends with a stirring cry, "Working men of all countries unite!"

Analysis of the Communist Manifesto

As one would expect, the Communist Manifesto is a declaration of the intentions of a communist organization. Yet it has proved to be much more than this. It has also served as a brief and concise explanation of the ideas that form the foundation of communist and socialist ideology.

It begins with the Marxian view of history as a class struggle. Marx thought that every age pitted two classes of society against each other beginning with masters and slaves, down to the bourgeoisie (or entrepreneurs) and the working class of his own day. One class always exploited the other because their interests were always diametrically opposed. As the lower class gained power a new class would arise that would eventually subsume the old upper class. Thus a kind of dialectical (two opposites producing a unified whole) process would create a merchant class and a working class from the struggle between the peasant and the nobility. But Marx felt that there was an end to this process. At some point the working class would eliminate all the remaining classes. If there was only one class, there would no longer be a class struggle. There would no longer be a need for all the trappings of class warfare such as money, nation-states and governments.

This quasi-Hegelian view of history would colour all of Marx's philosophy and would influence the entire Communist Manifesto (which would in turn influence generations of radicals). It was an idea that gave history the air of inevitability. Marx and Engels actually believed that they had discovered a scientific truth that could be applied in a scientific manner to the affairs of humanity. It has been over 150 years since the publication of the Communist Manifesto and the declaration has proved to be hollow in that many of its predictions have not been born out by actual history. There are many arguments as to why this is the case. It may be that some of the assumptions girding communist thought, including the labour theory of value were mistaken.

Yet the real problem with the Marxian ideas imbued in the manifesto might be that Marx misunderstood which class would ultimately subsume all the others. He was under the impression that labourers must ultimately take over the means of production and so destroy the capitalist system. What he could not understand was that the means of production would become less and less expensive all the

time due to efficiencies in production. Workers would themselves become entrepreneurs in free and republican societies. The advent of computers, and inexpensive access to the tools of a service industry would make small business a dominant and driving force.

The brewing industry is a perfect example of this. Where there used to be only one or two large brewers, now micro-breweries have become the rage. Where only a few networks dominated the airwaves now hundred of channels proliferate. The internet has opened publishing up to any person who has a few dollars to rent a server. The cost for entry into many, though not all, markets has become comparatively cheap. In essence Marx was wrong not because there was no class struggle. There was indeed class struggle throughout most of history. He was wrong because he could not see that the dialectic process would work to elevate the working class to the entrepreneur class and not pull all of society down to the lowest common denominator. We are still in the throes of this process. Eventually the efficiencies brought about by the capitalist system, if allowed to operate in a free environment, will provide a high standard of living for most of the world.

The Communist Manifesto still finds favour among many political groups and its tenets and ideas are worthy of study because there are economic and historical truths embedded within it. It has also proved to be the foundation of one of the most prominent economic and political movements of the 20th Century.

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THE INVENTION OF TRADITION IN RELATION TO IDEOLOGY

Introduction by Michiel Sustronk

The splendid workgroup eight focused on the relation between invented traditions and ideologies. So we did, discussing the useful contributions in the seminal meetings. We discussed a lot of angles upon the topic of invention of tradition. Ranging from representatives from Serbia (Jelena and Jovana), Croatia (Zjelka), Slovenia (Franci) to Rumania (Mihaila and Maria) Germany (Christian and Jan) to the Dutch influence by myself, Margriet and Björn. We encountered differences towards the unifying tendencies of the European Union. The discussions were not merely fruitful; they also took place in a very friendly and cordial atmosphere. I want to note that we did not always rigidly focus on the subject. Even heated debates concerning difficult topics such as World War Two and the recent Balkan war.

The general conclusion we formulated on Friday is that the old concept of invention of tradition as formulated by Hobsbawm is best applicable to nation states with very clear social and political stratifications. Most discussed in nineteenth and twentieth century chauvinism and nationalism, where a unity is wanted, people stress their common tradition and qualities. But in a globalizing world, the clear boundaries of these stratifications are vanishing. More and more atomized societies with more immigrants are making Hobsbawm's concept itself historical. Though it is basic idea should still be regarded as very useful. This is that people always seek to define themselves in a social or political context, by means of feeling part of something bigger. This human need will continue to present itself in all sorts of forms, varying from an abstract, multi-interpretable notion as 'European' to political Muslim defiance against the dominant west. For better or for worse, we'll be what we were: group-orientated entities.

FROM RESCUER TO TRAITOR AND VICE VERSA. THE IMAGE OF THE CHETNIK AND PARTISAN IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS FOR PRIMARY SCHOOLS (in the period 1993-2005)

Jelena Petakovic (University of Belgrade, Serbia)

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to show the production of a new ideology within the Serbian society, through the textbooks of History, using tradition and modulating it into ideology to the ephemeral benefits of a country's political situation. The example of Chetniks and Partisans will show the modulated representations of their activities during the Second World War. It demonstrates the query of who the rescuer or the traitor was, does not depend much on history but rather on the political benefit of the system. The tradition was plainly used as an instrument for the purpose.

History and tradition cannot be detached in human conscience and history analysis which allows creating the past with the help of tradition. Different interpretations of historical events cause different expectations of the future – therefore the expectations of the future cause the different picture of the past. Tradition is being used to create different ways of understanding some historical events and processes. And yet some of the functions of invented traditions are establishing or *symbolizing* social cohesion and collective *identities*; or establishing and *legitimizing* institutions and social hierarchies

One way to create new traditions and an ideology is the use of History textbooks. They can be looked upon as a national autobiography. They are an interesting historical matter to a researcher, because of the basic facts on society and ideological concept they offer which are used by the government to develop national and historical conscience.⁷³

73 Dubravka Stojanovic , *The Balkans, Wars and Textbooks – The Case of Serbia*, www.udi.org.yu

History

The Second World war lasted from 1941 till 1945 in the region of former Yugoslavia. There were two resistance movements in Serbia: Partisans and Chetniks. Partisans were military formation, organized by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia⁷⁴ and led by Josip Broz Tito. Communists⁷⁵ supported the offensive side of anti-occupant fight in general to gain the authority in the Second World War⁷⁶. The Chetnik movement was formatted by the group of Yugoslav officers and soldiers sheltered in Ravna Gora⁷⁷ after the April war. Their leader was an elite officer of the realm of Yugoslavia, Draza Mihajlovic. Their policy of war was an defensive one. They wanted to keep the Monarchy and they acted mainly in the territory of Serbia.

It is essential to mention that, besides fighting the Germans in Yugoslavia, there was a Civil War between the very two movements. The conflict was inevitable due to exclusive and uncompromising ideological, political and class conceptions. By the end of 80's, the Partisan movement was the only legal liberating one, whilst the Chetnik movement was treated as treacherous and collaborating. At the end of 80's, with the rise of nationalism in Serbia, the positive side of Chetnik movement is accented, and in general anti-communistic atmosphere, this role of Partisan movement faded, resulting the pointing ups towards their villainies. It should be said, that today, official Serbian historiography doesn't give objective view of these two movements. They are both still (mis)used in political purposes. Considering that the question on Chetniks and partisans is very complex, I shall concentrate on questions dealing with the subject which shows creation of some new historical views: Who are the traitors and who are the liberators? And there is the question on political continuity of Serbia?

History books

Nowadays, three history books for the 8th grade of Elementary schooling are put in circulation.⁷⁸ They all cover the period from 1878 until 1991. The first one was edited in 1993, after the decay of SFRJ. The second one dates from 2001/2003, made after Milosevic's deposal

74 Thereinafter-KPJ, KPJ was illegal until 1941.

75 Peculiar for them is that they were experienced in illegal fight and they had formatted an Army formation

76 Branko Petranovic, Serbia During the Second World War 1939-1945, Belgrade 1992, 749.

77 Therefore, one of the names of Chetnik movement – Ravnogorian, as the official name was Yugoslav Army in Patria.(Auth. JVUO)

78 Concerning children 14-15 years of age

and the last one was edited in 2005. As for the textbooks themselves, their characteristics are that they are based on one and the same methodological approach which is positivistic, traditional and fact-ridden⁷⁹ In all three of them there is only one explanation given for an event and it doesn't give any objective commentary, instead it supports the ideology that is needed for the moment. Circumstances should be clear and explicit to be sure of creating a tradition without too many explications involved. In addition there is the dispute on multi-perspective in history but obviously not risen in textbooks.

It seems that since 1989 history education in Serbia has had only one priority – to emphasize the national question⁸⁰. This is only one of the mutual characteristics, important for understanding the accent given on Chetniks, as they were thought to be „Serbian” matter, which favors awaking the nationalism and emphasizing the one in the textbooks. However, the differences amongst textbooks are substantial, not as common concept stated, but as the messages sent.

Foremost it is necessary to see who are liberators and who are traitors, in these textbooks. In the textbook(1993) it is alleged that “the war in Yugoslavia lasted from 1941 until 1945”. As for the textbook “there were two anti-fascistic movements, and the difference of ideology was significant: NOP⁸¹ was led by KPJ and Chetnik movement , was led by Draza Mihajlovic. It is meant that NOP and Chetnik movement cannot be equalized”⁸². It is clear from now on that the liberators are only partisans- “KPJ was the organizer and the organ of the liberating and revolutionary activity in all”⁸³. On the other hand, Chetniks were approved the status of anti-occupant movement, but not comparable to the Partisan contribution. There are four reasons stated in contribution to it – They were assisted from the very beginning by the allies, cooperation with Germans, the worst enemy was the Partisan, the fight for the restoration of Monarchy and

⁷⁹ Dubravka Stojanovic, *The Balkans, wars and Textbooks – The Case of Serbia*, www.udi.org.yu

⁸⁰ Radina Vucetic – Mladenovic, *Textbooks and the Teaching of Twentieth Century history in Serbia since 1989*, in: Martin Roberts (Ed.), *After The Wall History Teaching in Europe since 1989*, Hamburg 2004, 153.

⁸¹ National Liberating Party

⁸² Nikola Gacesa, Ljiljana Mladenovic – Maksimovic, Dusan Zivkovic, *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 1997, 137.

⁸³ Nikola Gacesa, Ljiljana Mladenovic – Maksimovic, *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 1997, 137

the opposition to social reforms. It all implies that Chetniks are traitors and collaborationists with the aim to exterminate the Partisans.

In the second textbook (2002) the existence of two movements is looked upon as having the same status – Partisans and Chetniks. It is not said there are no liberators nor traitors and not even the collaboration with the Germans mentioned. Both partisans and Chetniks were liberators. The third textbook (2005) tells about two movements of resistance – military Chetnik battalions and the Partisans. It comes to an equality of these two movements and even an accentuation of the Chetniks as being the braver fighters for freedom. Later on, it is stated that Partisans were the ones collaborating with Germans, not with the purpose of fighting Chetniks but for the mutual aim – the most important characteristics of these negotiations “⁸⁴(as it was the attitude of Partisan delegation) is to fight against western allies for the Class benefit: the victory in the Civil War”⁸⁵ Besides the cooperation with the Germans, it is specified that “the arrival of Red Army was precedent to dislodging Germans from Serbia, but also for the victory of Partisans in the Civil war, which was the purpose of its engagement.”⁸⁶ Partisans are here traitors, and the Chetniks are fighters against the occupant.

The important matter of creating ideology through tradition is the question of political continuity. There is no continuity of state and political system in Serbia, which brings the result of frequent wars⁸⁷. Hence, in certain political (critical) situations it is quested and invoked to continuity of certain historical events or processes. Nowadays, there are attempts to retrieve the continuity of Serbian Realm, even of Serbia from the time before the First World War, while erasing the communist system i.e. 50 years of such history in this region. The connection with democratic Serbia is supposed to be this very Chetnik movement.

⁸⁴ negotiations with Germans during May, the battle on Neretva, 1943

⁸⁵ Suzana Rajic, Kosta Nikolic, Nebojsa Jovanovic, *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 2005.

⁸⁶ Suzana Rajic, Kosta Nikolic, Nebojsa Jovanovic, *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 2005.

⁸⁷ From 1878 there were several wars in the territory of Serbia: the wars against Turks with some interruptions until 1912, Balkan wars 1912-1913, The First World war 1914-1918, The Second World war 1941-1945, war in the region of Yugosla via 1991-1995, NATO bombing 1999

Analysis

In the first textbook there aren't any questions on political continuity nor it is mentioned the connection between Partisans and Chetniks in some other periods of history. The second textbook brings Chetniks into the connection with some Serbian intellectuals from the time of realm of Serbia [Dragisa Vesic⁸⁸ and Slobodan Jovanovic⁸⁹] giving an accent to procreation of Great Serbia – “ Ravnogorian movement fought for the restitution of Yugoslavia where there Great Serbia should have been bounded. Those ere ideas of some leading Serbian intellectuals who were the members of “Serbian Cultural Club”⁹⁰ and Dragisa Vasic as its member⁹¹. The latest edition of the History textbook associates Chetniks to the tradition before the Second World War - the term of Chetnik is explained as “the famous name of the traditional Serbian rebellion ”⁹²,and later on “Ravnogorian movement represented the entity of Serbian Civil Resistance ”⁹³ connecting it with “Serbian Cultural Club”. The questions and assignments in the textbooks about the unit related to Chetnik movement are also very interesting. Authors made a parallel between 1915 and 1941, which cannot be justified from the aspect of historical methodology but represents a good way of making continuity for the important events in Serbian history , especially if dealt with heroic feat. The terms like “Serbian”, “Civil” or “Yugoslav Army in Patria” are related to Chetniks. They were used to show the legitimacy of the Chetnik movement, political continuity of Realm of Serbia and the connection of tradition and the First World War. This is an attempt of creating a new national concept of history, which combines old values with new aim⁹⁴.

⁸⁸ Dragisa Vesic – 1885-1945, writer and a politician

⁸⁹ Slobodan Jovanovic – 1869-1958, lawyer and historian, professor in the university of Belgrade. Један One of the leaders Serbian intellectuals of Monarchy. He was president of emigrants government in London 1942-1943.

⁹⁰ By the founders of this Club is Slobodan Jovanovic

⁹¹ Dusko M. Kovacevic, Dejan Mikavica, Branko Beslin, Biljana Simunovic-Beslin. *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 2002, 163.

⁹² Suzana Rajic, Kosta Nikolic, Nebojasa Jovanovic, *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 2005, 139.

⁹³ Suzana Rajic, Kosta Nikolic, Nebojasa Jovanovic, *History for the 8th grade of Elementary School*, Belgrade 2005, 140.

⁹⁴ Dubravka Stojanovic, *The Balkans, Wars and Textbooks – The Case of Serbia*, www.udi.org.yu.

Seemingly an irrelevant matter was even the way the textbooks were technically made. The first one was the worst and doesn't give the clear visual messages to the students, whilst the other two are technically well done with perfect and tendentious choice of illustrations and quotations. In the first textbook there is only one picture of Draza Mihajlovic dealing with Chetniks, but in the other two the number of pictures assimilates. It is easily concluded the new process of setting up and creating a new tradition, this example presents the one in the series of creating new social conscience.

There is now the simple question of how it is possible that someone turns to a traitor out of a liberator and vice versa? Or, how is it possible, in such an easy way, create a political continuity? Textbooks are obviously a consequence of certain changes within society. To completely understand the stated examples, the political situation of the country should be known by the reader. The two latest textbooks coincide with the process of democracy in the country, negating everything that connects Serbia with communist regime and emphasizing nationalism. To succeed, it ought to look for anchorage in history and the relation of different traditions

Conclusion

The liberators became traitors, and the traitors became liberators, by the one-sided view on history and invented traditions, all for the purpose of assistance to certain political ideology in society dictated by the momentary situation in Serbia. Where is the truth? What is history and what is politics? Is it possible to study tradition, without its studying and searching for the present?

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FOLKLORE RELIGION IN TRANSYLVANIA

(Religion's Fantastic Animals)

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Introduction

Romanian people were born as Christians and they then remained Christians. By entering in direct contact with animals, mankind saw them as if they were creatures with fabulous powers. Either divine or evil, based on the help or the damage that was experienced from these mythical animals. People had to cooperate with domestic animals and had to be afraid of the wild animals. The imaginary world transformed simple animals, first into objects of veneration, then, after Christianity imposed itself as a religion, animals became messengers of God. They were useful to man, or, on the contrary, being used by the devil to fight against human beings. Many animals had a dual symbolism; they had positive powers, but they could transform themselves into evil as well.

The dog

Ancient texts talk about the dog in a positive way. Romanian mythological folklore regards upon the dog as an animal with beneficial powers, as a companion and a protector of humankind. Many myths immortalized the dog as a friend and protector of the man; it does not symbolize a demonic creature. Torturing the dog, "*la tărbacă*", a symbolic ritual; has the role to increase soil's fertility. While crossing the fire the dog takes the shape of the *Igneic Dog*, who carries the fire which burns and ripens the crop. The domestic animal has, in this mythical and ceremonial ensemble, the role of a mediator between man and grains. However, the dog has also been seen as a demonic creature. Sometimes the mythological valences of the dog are much alike with the ones of the wolf. In Romanian folk it is believed that the devil takes the shape of a black or a red-haired dog.

The Romanian mythology had plotted a devilish being surrounding the negative elements from the dog's fantastic biography, named "*Cățelul Pământului*". Although the dog has a negative image concerning its embodiment in "*Cățelul Pământului*", an evil animal, the dog also has certain celestial powers. When a dog barks with wilderness in its voice evil spirits are crossing near the house. In some Romanian churches a few paintings represents the image of a Saint with a dog head, named Saint Christopher. A Saint who, before his Christian baptize, had practiced pagan rituals.

The ram and the sheep

The sheep has spiritual importance; it has fantastic powers, always helping its master just like a faithful dog. Traditionally speaking the sheep is a sacred animal, men who greed sheep are luckily in everything they do. Legends tell us that the sheep is the creation of God. Ancient believes consecrated the sacred sheep in a powerful folklore theme of the enchanted sheep. The fabulous ram is also a sacred animal invoked in ballads, for example the ballad named "*Costea*". In Romanian mythology, it has a special place; being present on peasants' decorative textures and sculptures. The presence of the horns of the ram in Romanian art shows its importance in ancient times. The sacred ram and especially the sacred sheep have, because of their privileged position in Romanian mythology, a mediator role between man and God, which is often used in burial ceremonies. The sheep is a ritual gift offered to the dead man's soul to help him in the world beyond.

The horse

The animal named horse appears in all mythologies, crossing some stormy historical adventures from the beginnings until present days. Man used horses in wars and they became the symbol of the war. Rituals, which included the horse, spread fast in Dacia, after Christianity had imposed itself as the official religion. The horse represented one of the important figures of the mythological books of beasts. The horse, in Romanian mythology, individualized itself through its contradictory attributes. It is believed that the continuous hunger of the animal is actually a sacral punishment. The infernal horse always helps evil spirits like devils or witches. The Romanian book of beasts has special names for them, such as "*Zburătorul*",

“Zmeul”, “Strigoiul”, or “Vântoasele”.

At Saint Toader’s night, evil ghosts can occur and take shape, transforming themselves into a mixture between horse and man. The horse has an important role as a guide to dead souls. Christianity took some of these meanings into its own rituals, since then an important object in the burial ritual is symbolically named Saint Michael’s horse.

Despite these negative connotations, the horse has some good powers as well. God likes horses; people believe that the horse is sacred, being blessed by Saint Elias. Horses were given the power to travel between the two worlds. Riding is an attribute of young men, in this equation the main characteristic is the relationship between man and horse.

Christianity put the horses under the protection of important figures from the Christian orthodox calendar, like Saint Elias, Saint George, Saint Demeter and Saint Toader. The horse is a symbol of richness, being represented in peasants’ art (textures and sculptures). The themes representing a horse head can be found in the architecture of Transylvanian churches, where the polished image of the horse is being reproduced.

The snake

The snake is an important mythological animal; it is a symbol of the ancient representations and thoughts about the universe. In some mythological visions the snake has wings, taking the shape of a dragon, mastering the wind. Changing its skin every year, the snake symbolizes the nature’s perpetual reborn. Romanian legends represent this myth, about Saint George and the dragon, in an original way. The snake, considered a sacred animal almost in the entire world since immemorial times, has left a deep mark in people’s consciousness.

The two-headed snake represented on the bishops’ staff symbolizes the wisdom, man must be wise just like the snake. In Romanian mythology however, the snake represents evilness, because of its bite that causes death. But most of all because of its mythological threat that the snake is considered to be for the whole world. If the snake is killed, the action is considered a sin. Every house must have its sacred snake, sometimes even the man must have his own guardian snake that dies only when the man dies. As a master of the underground world, the snake is the guardian of the two worlds.

Man developed a way of making the evil snake to stay far away from his home by smoking and sculpturing the stables, one of the snake favorite places. It must be mentioned that the medicine role of the snake's skin, by cooking the snake in a magical way man could possess fabulous powers such as being able to understand the language of animals, or the power to see malefic creatures. Traditionally speaking, the devil takes the shape of a snake or a dragon. The snake is a complex and dualist symbol. It is the devil's embodiment, but also known as a sacred snake of the house which symbolizes the supreme goodness, as well as the symbol of wisdom.

Conclusion

Animals had always exerted a strong fascination upon man's imagination. Ancient religions venerated the animals, symbols of the gods. When Christianity became a religion some of the pagan elements were transformed into Christian elements, animals were seen as the heralds of God, having good powers or evil powers, depending on their relationship with Divinity, or their pagan importance in ancient times. A conciliatory practice has been chosen, the practice of including ancient gods and symbols or rituals in the new religion, making them heralds of the unique God. Mircea Eliade named this mythological but Christian religion from southeastern Europe a "cosmic Christianity". This religion teaches the man to live wisely, peacefully in ambience with human beings and nature as well.

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ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

We had a great conference in Utrecht with more than eighty participants from all over Europe. There were students from different universities in the Netherlands (Nijmegen, Utrecht, Eindhoven), Germany (Berlin, Marburg, Heidelberg), Switzerland (Bern, Zurich), Croatia (Zagreb, Pula, Osijek), Hungary (Debrecen), Finland (Turku, Helsinki), Serbia-Montenegro (Belgrade), Rumania (Bucarest, Oradea), Slovenia (Ljubljana). Most of the time we worked in working groups, but there was also time to show the cultural and social life of Utrecht. The program gives a short impression of the week. It was a great meaningful and educative experience. Thanks ISHA!

Programme

The programme of the “Ideologies through history” congress as stated schematically.

Mo 17 April	Entire day	Arrival
	18.00	Meal at university, Drift 21
	21.00	Introduction drink
Tu 18 April	09.30	Breakfast
	10.30	Introduction speech and lectures
	12.00	Lunch
	13.30	Teacher tutorial
	15.30	City walk and visiting the Dom tower
	19.00	Meal in the city centre of Utrecht, Biton
	21.00	Historical pub crawl

We 19 April	09.30	Breakfast
	12.00	Lunch and visiting Amsterdam
	14.30 -17.00	City walk and museum visit in Amsterdam
	20.00	Meal in Amsterdam, UvA
	23.00	Student meeting in Utrecht.
Th 20 April	09.30	Breakfast
	10.30	Tutorial
	12.00	Lunch
	13.30	'General Assembly meeting' or tutorial
	18.00	Meal in the city centre of Utrecht, Veritas
	21.00	Cultural evening
Fr 21 April	09.30	Breakfast
	10.30	Tutorial
	13.00	Lunch
	14.30	Final Conclusions
	19.30	Meal in the city centre of Utrecht, Pernassos
	22.00	Goodbyes
Sa 22 April	09.30	Breakfast
	13.00	Departure

